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Priorities of the Slovak Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union
R o b e r t  F i c o
Slovakia has assumed its Presidency role at a time when the European Union finds itself in an unprecedented situa-tion. The negative outcome of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU has presented us with a new chal-lenge and for the first time, we have to deal with a Member 
State leaving the EU. 
 This comes after a number of other challenges that affect the EU´s 
overall shape and we observe a certain sense of political fragmenta-
tion. This is of our concern because fragmentation makes us vulner-
able – internally and externally. The Slovak Presidency is therefore 
set to approach current challenges 
from a positive angle. Our priori-
ties will centre around four ambi-
tions: to make European economy 
stronger; to modernise and broad-
en the single market in areas such 
as energy and digital economy; to 
work towards sustainable migration 
and asylum policy; and to be more 
engaged with our external environ-
ment, namely through strong trade 
and enlargement policy. There will 
be a clear common denominator 
for these priority areas. Firstly, it 
is our aim to overcome fragmenta-
tion – by being an engine of posi-
tive agenda and an advocate of long-term solutions that unite us and 
work on the ground. Secondly, we are determined to deliver tangible 
results for our citizens – something that could help strengthening their 
connection to the EU. 
 At this juncture, it is really vital that the EU engages in self-reflec-
tion. We have to work harder to strengthen people’s confidence, even 
enthusiasm for the European project. Because whatever the critics 
say, there is no better alternative to mutual cooperation. That is pre-
cisely why we put a strong emphasis on positive projects that first, 
unite us, and second, deliver tangible results for citizens across the 
EU. 
 We want push the agenda on economic growth in order to boost 
investments by focusing on a triangle: the European Fund for Stra-
tegic Investment – the CMU – the EU budget. Investment in the EU 
is still well below its pre-crisis average. The investment gap is about 
1.7% of GDP for the EU. The EFSI has surpassed expectations and 
therefore, when a mid-term review takes place, the Slovak Presiden-
cy will be ready to take up any proposal to further foster or reinforce 
the EFSI. Another flagship project is the capital markets union – a true 
single market for capital. It would, among other things, unlock new 
sources of cross-border funding for business, including the SMEs – a 
backbone of our economies – that remain heavily dependent on the 
banking sector. In practice, it means that we are set to finish the job 
on the Prospectus regulation and we also aim at making progress in 
the field of European venture capital funds and Money Market Funds. 
 Europe is at a crossroad today and trust of citizens in the viability 
of European project is dented. We are clearly in need of a compre-
hensive positive agenda for our citizens and businesses. After years 
of economic stagnation and digital divide, they want to see improve-
ments in their quality of life and 
in the work delivered by the EU. 
Therefore, the Slovak Presidency 
sees as a strategic choice what we 
are going to do or not going to do 
in the Digital Single Market agenda 
because it will have significant im-
pacts on the developments in the 
years ahead. 
 The digital single market is 
built on data economy and its vari-
ous applications. This is the new 
gold of the 21st century. To ac-
commodate the skyrocketing data 
traffic, we need to ensure enough 
frequency spectrums being harmo-
nised on the EU level and allocated to mobile internet services. The 
Slovak Presidency will work towards a deal on the 700MHz proposal 
which will enable harmonisation of this key spectrum frequency band 
for the purposes of wireless broadband and will pave the way for 5G 
services. 
 Furthermore, the Slovak Presidency will invite ministers to dis-
cuss ways to improve rules on spectrum assignment in general, un-
der the review of telecommunications framework. To bring tangible 
benefits for consumers, we will work towards ensuring that as of 15 
June 2017, EU citizens can roam without additional fees, including for 
mobile data services, in Europe. 
 Cross-border portability of movies or music is also one of the vis-
ible possible achievements. We will push for negotiations with the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Measures to deal with the practice of unjustified 
geo-blocking constitute a top priority for us to unlock the benefits of 
a huge market for all. We will have to navigate through consumers´ 
interests and traders´ obligations. This will have to be coupled by 
strengthened market surveillance. The end result will be a balancing 
act and we aim at the Council position during our Presidency. 
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 The Energy Union offers an exceptional framework to unite the 
Member States in their diversity – be it regarding their energy mix, 
their industries or households. The most pressing challenge is shared 
by the whole EU – climate change. The Paris agreement is our cur-
sor. Building of the Energy Union is offering various solutions but due 
account should be taken of their impacts on energy security, competi-
tiveness of our industry and households. Our Presidency will aim at 
a balanced approach to make good use of our climate targets to spur 
employment, new technologies and to ensure secure and affordable 
supply of energy.
 Concretely, we will work on several fronts. To achieve energy se-
curity, the Presidency will press for agreements with the Parliament 
on security of supply and intergovernmental gas agreements. A prag-
matic compromise on these proposals would substantially contribute 
to compliance with EU law and increase transparency on the market. 
Energy efficiency is the other side of the same coin as energy security 
– well established framework helps savings and promotes competi-
tiveness of our energy dependent economies, while contributing to 
energy security. Our Presidency is set to achieve an overall agree-
ment with regard to labelling and will prepare grounds for discussions 
on energy efficiency overall and energy efficient buildings. To further 
cut greenhouse gases and to promote low carbon economy, we will 
strive to achieve the ratification of the Paris agreement at EU level. 
The Presidency will also discuss the reform of the emission trading 
scheme to achieve a position of the Council at the end of this year. 
Good and predictable functioning scheme is the best guarantee for 
our economy. But all sectors have to contribute and proposals to cut 
emissions in transport or construction will equally merit our full atten-
tion. In short, the Presidency is happy to breathe life into the Energy 
Union and bring number of its proposals forward until the end of 2016. 
 Everyone can be sure that the Slovak Presidency will be an hon-
est broker, a credible and constructive manager, negotiator or media-
tor. However, let us avoid dangerous simplifications. The Presidency 
cannot be narrowed down to one single area, namely migration, and 
at the same time, this one single area cannot be narrowed down to 
one single file, the revision of the Dublin regulation. 
 There still is a great deal of unfinished business. Continuing con-
trols at several internal border crossing are the biggest reminder – 
therefore, we must do what it takes to return to a proper functioning 
of the Schengen. The Netherlands Presidency has done a great job 
of creating the European Border Guards. However, it is one thing to 
have it on paper and another thing is to make it operational. This is 
our task. We are also set to put a lot of efforts into the smart borders 
package to modernize the Schengen’s external borders. Moreover, 
we need to establish effective cooperation with third countries of ori-
gin and transit. The EU-Turkey agreement remains an important part 
of it.  
 Speaking of the Common European Asylum System, there will 
be altogether some seven legislative proposals on our table in July. 
Nothing is going to be shelved or frozen. But we believe a complex, 
thorough look is needed, with less divisive elements at first, perhaps. 
 The credible enlargement process is one of the Presidency pri-
orities. Given our experience, we are convinced that enlargement 
should not be neglected as it remains a key instrument to stabilize our 
neighbourhood. We believe that this process should be credible on 
both sides which means that we also actively communicate that the 
path towards the EU leads via rigorous reforms.  
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Trends in the enhancement of energy 
performance of buildings in Lithuania
K ę s t u t i s  T r e č i o k a s
Lithuania has a population of 3 million, and over 35,000 apart-ment buildings, most erected before 1993. These apartment buildings can usually be characterised by heat consumption that exceeds the consumption rate elsewhere in the EU sev-eral times over. It is clear the main way out is through cuts 
on energy consumption, and through dealing with issues of climate 
changes and other issues pressing to Lithuania and international 
community, which is improved energy performance of apartment 
buildings. 
 In 2004, Lithuania approved the National Housing Strategy by 
2020, including a key target to secure apartment building renovation, 
simultaneously cutting on energy costs. Pursuant to the strategy, an 
Apartment Building Renovation (Modernisation) Programme was de-
veloped in 2005 (hereinafter the Programme), with key focus on im-
proved energy performance of apartment building with lowest energy 
performance. 
 For a number of years, however, the Programme has met with 
a number of obstacles, and therefore in the period of 2005 to 2012, 
just over 400 apartments building were renovated nationwide. Eco-
nomic crisis may have played a part here, yet national experts believe 
key reason behind was inadequate mechanism of apartment building 
renovation; not only were the apartment owners required to take ac-
tion and arrange for renovation of their apartment buildings; they were 
further responsible for overseeing construction works, and securing 
credits on their own.
 In 2013, the new Government, being aware of the importance of 
apartment building renovation programme, took on some key chang-
es. It has examined the current situation (at the time, as little as a 
dozen apartment buildings were renovated nationwide, and sought 
ways to turn the policy on energy performance in a favourable direc-
tion. 
 In the early 2013, the Government, relying on the conclusions of 
the analyses conducted, and insights offered by national experts in 
energy, finance, and economy, presented to the public a new model 
of apartment building renovation programme primarily targeting im-
proved energy performance of apartment building with lowest energy 
performance. Essentially, under the new model, apartment own-
ers are no longer required to take on any obligations (whether in 
terms of organisation, or credit), or other project implementation 
risks. The apartment owners are now essentially required to of-
fer their general consent to the implementation of investment 
projects on improved energy performance, and, without any fur-
ther costs, repay the investment granted to respective apartment 
building using funds saved in the form of municipal charges. 
 The new model focuses on municipalities as a key to successful 
renovation. Every local municipality has been called to select apart-
ment buildings with lowest energy performance, and then to arrange 
for drafting and presentation to the local residents of investment ren-
ovation projects. Subject to an approval by the apartment owners, 
the administrators appointed by municipalities are now in charge of 
funding and quality and renovation management. Besides, it is on the 
administrators appointed by municipalities, rather than on the local 
residents, that the responsibility for the performance is now placed.
 Now that over 3 years have passed since the reform of the above 
Programme of renovation of apartment buildings, the new model has 
clearly brought an impetus to the renovation processes that have 
been stalling for a decade. Since 2013, over 1,100 apartment build-
ings have been renovated in Lithuania, while renovation of another 
800 apartment buildings is still ongoing. Consequently, by late 2016, 
completion of over 1,500 apartment building renovation projects is 
expected, including 80% projects to be implemented based on the 
new Programme model, involving municipalities (with the remaining 
20% of the projects to be completed based on initiative of residents, 
i.e. using the old model of renovation). 
 While the Government focuses on the long-term renovation of 
apartment buildings, it does not neglect quality of renovation (com-
pared to increased scale of the Programme). Approval of the new 
renovation model was followed by a detail review and stricter quality 
monitoring and control system in the building sector.
 To make sure the renovation runs smoothly and transparently, the 
procurement system of works was completely rearranged, and to-
date, procurements are mainly conducted via the Central Contracting 
Authority. 
 The progress demonstrated by Lithuania implementing apartment 
building renovation programme is reflected by both an increased con-
fidence of local residents in renovation processes, and by assess-
ment by the institutions of the EU, as well as by the governments of 
other EU Member States, that expect to share our experience in the 
sector.
 A successful apartment building renovation programme is but the 
first step in order to secure greater national energy performance. It 
is now clear that as long as renovation involves individual buildings, 
as long as renovation programmes exclude districts or groups of 
buildings, as long as integrated measures of improvement of energy 
performance are not chosen and implemented adequately, a marked 
energy performance remains out of reach on municipality and even 
more so, on the national level. 
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 The Government has therefore, in light of key advantages offered 
by the new model of renovation, drafted further trends on enhance-
ment of energy performance; the proposals on the table concern 
moving from renovation of individual buildings to integrated measures 
of improvement of energy performance, including renovation of heat 
generation and supply sector, street lighting grids, engineering infra-
structure etc.
 To ensure improvement of an integrated district energy perfor-
mance, the Lithuanian Government has, in cooperation with the Fed-
eral Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety, launched a pilot project on enhancement of district 
energy performance across 3 municipalities here in Lithuania, intend-
ed to develop a platform to serve as a basis for an-going integrated 
district renovation. 
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Nordic defence cooperation – and 
beyond
P e t e r  C h r i s t e n s e n
On 1 January 2016 Denmark assumed the chairmanship of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). As Danish Minister of Nordic Cooperation and Minister of Defence it is clear to me that Nordic defence cooperation has both great practical and political value for the Nordic 
countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) – as well 
as beyond our Nordic borders. 
 NORDEFCO is an important regional forum for practical military 
cooperation between the Nordic countries but is also a forum in which 
the Nordic countries discuss the defence and security developments 
and challenges in the region. Furthermore, NORDEFCO is a frame-
work for much valued cooperation with the Baltic States, Poland, UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands as well as the US.
 The success of close cooperation in NORDEFCO is to a large 
extent due to the fact that the Nordic countries share many values and 
interests on issues of defence and security while maintaining different 
affiliations to NATO and the EU. These shared values and interests 
enable the Nordic countries to cooperate on a wide array of issues in 
several international organisations, as well as bilaterally. And I believe 
that the times we live in will foster even further cooperation between 
the Nordic countries in the future. Therefore, the Danish NORDEFCO 
chairmanship has had an ambitious – and realistic – agenda. 
Current initiatives
NORDEFCO is first and foremost about finding common practical so-
lutions to shared problems. Currently, the Nordic Armed Forces are 
cooperating on many different projects, such as joint Nordic combat 
uniforms and sharing of tactical air transport capacity – projects initiat-
ed under previous successful chairmanships. In the following I would 
like to highlight a few important initiatives under way in 2016. 
 In January 2016, Denmark and Sweden signed a military frame-
work agreement which will enable our countries’ armed forces to 
gain access to each other’s air and sea territories in peacetime much 
more rapidly. Following this agreement, the Nordic countries are now 
collectively working on a similar agreement within the NORDEFCO-
framework, which would include military access to the land, air and 
sea domains. This initiative from the Danish chairmanship has been 
dubbed “Easy Access” and it fulfils a shared need in the Nordic coun-
tries; the need to be able to move and operate in a more agile manner 
and more rapidly in our region – while doing so with fewer resources.
 Another initiative is the ability to share information better – to en-
sure the best possible level of situational awareness. For this reason 
the Nordic countries are working on signing an agreement which ena-
bles the sharing of radar data in the Nordic region. Such an agree-
ment would contribute greatly to ensure the best possible level of situ-
ational awareness for the Nordic countries. 
 Nordic defence cooperation, however, is not limited to the Nordic 
region and the Baltic Sea area. On the contrary. In the spring of 2016 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium signed a rotational 
concept ensuring C-130 air transport capacity for the UN mission in 
Mali until the end of 2018. The purpose of the development of such 
a concept is to create a more consistent model for the much needed 
military contributions to UN missions. Such a concept – and the prac-
tical reasoning behind it – is a good example of Nordic defence coop-
eration and NORDEFCO projects that ensure operational efficiency 
and stability to missions outside of the Nordic region and that is open 
for participation to non-Nordic countries.  
Nordic-Baltic cooperation
The Nordic-Baltic relationship rests on a bond which has been forged 
historically and strengthened by mutual interests and geography. 
Thus, within the framework of NORDEFCO, as well as bilaterally, ef-
forts are being made to enable ever closer cooperation between the 
Nordic countries and the Baltic states. In accordance with the Nordic-
Baltic declaration of 2015 on specific areas of cooperation, we have 
developed guidelines on how we engage and develop concrete ar-
eas of cooperation in a Nordic-Baltic context. Furthermore, the Nor-
dic-Baltic countries are heavily involved in projects in Georgia and 
Ukraine, supporting important reforms in the military sector.
Closer cooperation
I have entitled my article “Nordic defence cooperation – and beyond”. 
Heading into the second half of the Danish chairmanship of NOR-
DEFCO, I can say unequivocally that I consider Nordic defence coop-
eration to be progressing well and being as strong as it has ever been. 
 Over a wide range of issues, the Nordic countries are intensifying 
practical and political cooperation.
 In my opinion, this shows the pragmatic and practical approach 
that the Nordic countries have with regards to Nordic defence co-
operation – an approach which further strengthens cooperation and 
security in the Nordic region and beyond. Thus, Nordic defence co-
operation is not only beneficial for us in the region. It also projects 
stability and inspiration beyond our borders. 
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What does G20 Hangzhou Summit 
mean for Sino-Finnish cooperation
Y U  Q i n g t a i
On September 4 - 5, the 11th G20 Summit was held in Hangzhou, China under the theme of “Toward an Inno-vative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy”. Leaders of G20 member states and 8 guest countries as well as heads of 7 international organiza-
tions attended the Summit. During the Summit, the G20 Leaders’ 
Communiqué Hangzhou Summit and 28 specific outcome documents 
were issued , which includes G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, Presidency Statement on Climate Change 
at the G20 Sherpa Meeting, etc. 
 The G20 Hangzhou Summit is a meeting held in the most com-
plex situation, facing the most diverse challenges and carrying high 
expectation of all parties since the international financial crisis. The 
outcomes demonstrate the partnership spirit of facing challenges 
together, and charted the course for world economic growth with a 
series of practical action plans. G20 member states jointly formulated 
the blueprint on innovative growth as well as three action plans for in-
novation, new industrial revolution and the digital economy. All sides 
have also drafted the joint document to improve mid-long term growth 
potential of the world economy through structural reform. These re-
sults are expected to restore the vigor of global economic growth.
 In the Summit, China came up with the initiative of jointly building 
an innovative, open, interconnected and inclusive world economy, in 
light of prominent problems in current world economy. To maintain 
sustainable and steady growth and deliver more development oppor-
tunities to the world, China made five proposals that should be ad-
hered to, echoing the five concepts of innovative, coordinated, green, 
open and shared development proposed in China’s 13th Five-Year 
Plan. It has demonstrated the direction of China’s future develop-
ment, and responded to concerns of the international community over 
China’s economic prospects. 
 While the five proposals lay out the blueprint for China’s develop-
ment, it also reveals new opportunities for Sino-Finnish cooperation:
 First, new measures such as enhancing the quality of trade, open-
ing wider to the world, providing more accessibility for foreign invest-
ments, will bring more opportunities for Finnish businesses. China will 
set up 7 new free trade zones, bringing the total to 11. Finnish compa-
nies will find a level playing field and a more transparent environment 
in China. Finnish quality products and services will enjoy even greater 
popularity in Chinese market.  
 Second, innovation can be a key area for bilateral cooperation. 
Finland is well known for its outstanding spirit of innovation, and is 
one of the innovation leaders in the EU in scientific, technological as 
well as cultural creativity. China is implementing the innovation-driven 
development strategy so as to leverage the role of innovation as the 
primary growth driver and make growth quality based rather than 
quantity based. China is ready to further its cooperation with Finland 
on innovation. 
 The third area is urbanization. In the coming years, China will ex-
perience rapid regional integration and urbanization. And in the field 
of urban planning and social governance, China has a lot to learn 
from the Finland’s comprehensive legal framework and its experi-
ence. There is unlimited potential for mutual exchanges and coopera-
tion in coordinated regional development and urbanization.
 Green economy is the fourth area. Finland is a pioneer in clean-
tech, green economy and sustainable development. China will un-
waveringly pursue a strategy of sustainable development and stay 
committed to green development. “Beautiful Beijing” project between 
China and Finland has been doing well so far. Cooperation is realized 
in R&D work, university cooperation and in business. Even stronger 
clean-tech demand is foreseen in Chinese market, as in the next five 
years, China’s water and energy consumption as well as CO2 emis-
sion per unit of GDP will be cut down by 23%, 15% and 18% respec-
tively.
 Last, but not least, there will be new opportunities in the field of 
public service and social security. China and Finland are both facing 
challenges in reform of healthcare system and aging society. We have 
had effective exchanges and cooperation in medical service and pub-
lic health. In the future, public service and social security will become 
a new area of cooperation between China and Finland. In turn this will 
contribute to our respective growth.  
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A n t t i  R i n n e
Time for a new direction
The European Union is often described as a peace project – and for good reason. What started out as the European Coal and Steel Community between six Central Europe-an countries in 1951 was more than a first step to-
wards European economic integra-
tion and an internal market. Europe 
had been divided by the two world 
wars and the scars were still fresh in 
the 1950s. European countries were 
slowly finding their feet in between 
the world’s two superpowers during 
the Cold War era. Important yet often 
misunderstood or underappreciated 
factors helping in the stabilisation of 
Europe were the integration of the European metal and weapons in-
dustries within the common market, and cooperation with the Federal 
Republic of Germany, which was of course on the losing side in the 
Second World War. 
 European integration has been rapid over the last few decades. 
It has been an intentional but also inevitable consequence of vari-
ous crises. The EU has become a tight union of 28 Member States 
that have a common trading policy and cooperate closely in foreign 
and security policy, among other areas. The European debt crisis 
has forced the eurozone countries to reform their economic policies, 
which has meant greater integration and compliance with common 
rules. The recent refugee crisis and the changing security environ-
ment in Europe and Ukraine, Turkey and the Middle East have, once 
again, required closer cooperation under exceptional circumstances. 
 The United Kingdom recently voted to leave the EU. The conse-
quences of this remain to be seen. Some believe that Euroscepticism 
and populism will gain ground, while others hope that consensus will 
be easier to find on certain issues following Brexit. It is however clear 
that the EU will lose an important financial driver and the greatest 
military power in Europe. Brexit needn’t – and shouldn’t – mean no 
cooperation with the UK. We must now look for a mutually beneficial 
cooperation agreement that will guarantee close trading relationships 
in the future.
 Brexit was perhaps a culmination of the criticism of the EU, which 
has faced one crisis after another in recent decades. Some of this 
criticism has been justified. Ordinary people’s voices have not been 
heard enough when dealing with the financial crisis: many feel that 
resources are allocated to the stabilisation of the financial market 
and national economies. People living in countries that have received 
bailout packages have been forced to take responsibility for the fact 
that an effective taxation system is not in place everywhere. Brexit 
has also made the EU a scapegoat for the impacts of globalisation 
that are beyond the EU’s control, such as industry moving to low-cost 
countries. 
 Unfortunately, the EU has failed to make people feel that it has 
a positive impact on their everyday lives. People feel the EU is too 
distant and bureaucratic. In order to justify its right to exist in the fu-
ture, the EU must focus in particular 
on issues that Europeans feel are the 
core of the EU. Internal markets must 
be made more efficient. The develop-
ment of digital internal markets may 
bring tangible advantages to Europe-
ans by means of better cross-border 
trade in goods and digital services. 
Ordinary people must be placed 
more at the centre of EU politics. This 
means a greater focus on employ-
ment and investments. Both national 
and EU-level measures are needed to improve participation and the 
fight against poverty. Free movement of people must be maintained. 
The EU has given millions of Europeans the opportunity to work and 
study in an EU country other than their home country. This develop-
ment must be supported on all fronts, because it will also benefit the 
EU economy.
 Member States bear a great responsibility in terms of EU policy-
making. The European Commission proposes laws, but the heads 
of state define the general guidelines. Member States decide how 
the EU will develop. The Baltic States, for instance, are a good ex-
ample of countries supporting the integration of the EU. Since their 
accession in 2004, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have wanted to be 
at the core of the Union and they all joined the eurozone since 2010. 
Finland also wants to actively participate in various forms of coopera-
tion. This is not the case for all countries. The challenge is to find a 
common view on the future of the EU. The debate over its direction is 
ongoing in Paris, Berlin and Rome. The same debate must take place 
in Finland, other Nordic countries and the Baltic States. Although the 
forms of future cooperation remain to be seen, the fact is that the 
greatest challenges of our times – climate change, organised crime 
and terrorism, migration, financial crises, changes in industry or the 
fight against tax havens – demand answers that no one country alone 
can give. Problems do not stop at national borders. They can only be 
solved in cooperation with other countries.   
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In  order  to  just i fy  i ts  r ight 
to  exis t  in  the future ,  the 
EU must  focus in  par t icular 
on issues  that  Europeans 
feel  are  the core  of  the EU.
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Attractive coastal and archipelago 
regions at the threshold of a new era  
Porvoo’s archipelago is a unique entity as part of the north zone of the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic Sea region. The ar-chipelago and coastal regions have always been significant throughout history among the international trading regions. These regions have been the source of many technical in-
novations and new ideas that spread widely to the surrounding areas. 
Today the archipelago is still unique in its nature as a residential and 
living environment, as well as a charming and potentially important 
network of tourism and adventure travel destinations.   
 Eastern Uusimaa’s archipelago region is 2,946 square kilometers, 
almost 90 percent of which is water. Permanent archipelago residents 
number about 3,000, the majority of whom live in the area of the town 
of Porvoo.   
 The region’s population multiplies during the summer season 
due to the expansive holiday home establishments, and a growing 
number of summer residents want to update their holiday homes to 
year-round residences. Kilpilahti, located in the vicinity of Porvoo’s 
archipelago, is the Nordic region’s largest integrated petrochemical 
and energy industry production complex, with Finland’s largest port, 
exporting c. 8.7 million tons annually (2015).   
    
The archipelago development program promotes the 
archipelago’s opportunities for development  
The opportunities for development of Porvoo and Eastern Uusimaa’s 
archipelago and coastal area are being promoted by a special ar-
chipelago development program. The program recognizes both chal-
lenges and new future possibilities. The program will help to reconcile 
the needs of the sensitive natural environment, traditional industry, 
public services, protection of the Baltic Sea, growing maritime traffic 
and new, upcoming opportunities, such as telecommuting and tour-
ism. 
 The goal of the archipelago development program is to secure a 
vibrant archipelago population and industrial and commercial activity 
in Eastern Uusimaa’s coastal and archipelago regions for decades 
to come. Development entities are recognized by cooperation with 
private actors, residents and public administration.   
 The construction of a water supply and sewage network, energy 
production, roads, high-speed telecommunications and other infra-
structure are the key challenges, especially in those areas where the 
population is relatively small. The sea, decentralization of the popula-
tion and long distances form a challenging equation for a sustainable 
economy.   
 The goal of the archipelago development program is to find ways 
to ensure the preservation of the archipelago’s permanent residential 
areas, but also to develop new businesses. New opportunities are 
found in the coordination of public and private services, improving the 
efficiency of planning and land use, new environmentally friendly and 
renewable energy solutions and the expansion and innovative use of 
electric services.  
Vitality results from a merging of traditional and modern 
possibilities  
One of the most crucial issues affecting the future of the archipelago 
areas is the development and strengthening of the region’s culture 
and community. Traditional archipelago culture, a relaxed way of life 
that respects nature and the importance of local entrepreneurship, 
are strong values upon which new possibilities can be built. According 
to the program, the future of archipelago residents could be shaped 
out of an ecological way of life that is close to nature, in which work 
and living are combined using state-of-the-art communications and 
environmental technology.  
 The vision for Eastern Uusimaa’s archipelago has been planned 
following principles of sustainable development. The archipelago’s 
vitality is rooted in the successful merging of traditional and modern 
opportunities. The key is to see cooperation between the region’s 
residents, entrepreneurs and authorities as an opportunity and as a 
new, creative process.    
 The vision is founded on the assumption that the population will 
grow in a controlled manner and that new young families and people 
of working age will also move to the archipelago. Basic services, pub-
lic transportation and other regional infrastructure also support devel-
opment. The program strives to take advantage of opportunities in the 
archipelago within new industries, such as tourism and recreational 
activity services and new possibilities for business are being com-
bined with traditional archipelago trades. We can also take advantage 
of the digitalization of the world around us in new ways.  
 The Eastern Uusimaa and Porvoo archipelago is confronting the 
same challenges as other Baltic Sea regions. The state of the natural 
environment, change in the demographics of the population, chal-
lenges to the security environment, economic fluctuations and espe-
cially risks to the delicate archipelago nature posed by the increasing 
maritime traffic are present both in everyday life and when consider-
ing a new future era. Possibilities to build and maintain a unique and 
economically and ecologically sustainable coastal and archipelago 
region are nonetheless still good.   
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Southwest Finland aims to be a 
pioneer in climate politics
E l i n a  R a n t a n e n
Climate change is regarded as the most challenging en-vironmental problem in the world by the majority of re-searchers. Although there still are some ignorant and skeptic attitudes towards the impacts of global warming in northern parts of the world, there luckily are cities and 
regions that have taken climate change seriously and set ambitious 
targets to tackle it. Despite the skeptics, global warming will affect 
the North as well: its nature and climate will change, and the amount 
of climate refugees from different parts of the world will concern all 
countries and regions. It is also just that the ones who are the big-
gest causers of global warming are the ones to fight the hardest to 
manage it.
 Finland has committed to reduce its greenhouse gases 80 % 
by the year 2050. Since the decisions and their implementation are 
made locally, it is vitally important that cities and regions have com-
mitted to the goal as well. Two thirds of the population in Finland live 
in the cities. Thus, the good old rule still applies: think globally, act 
locally. 
 Southwest Finland is one of the regions where ambitious targets 
in climate politics have been set both regionally and in the cities. This 
work aims at resource wisdom that refers to the activities that do not 
produce climate emissions, but use available resources without wast-
ing them. Resource wisdom is understood both by environmental ac-
tivists and economists, and it has thereby become a popular concept. 
The climate program of Southwest Finland states that “Sooner or later 
we have to develop and apply resource wise solutions, but pioneers 
are the ones who get the biggest advantages”. It goes without saying 
that Southwest Finland aims to be a pioneer by implementing carbon 
neutral solutions in the region.
 There are several different actions listed in the climate program 
of Southwest Finland from ecological food production to protecting 
wastewater treatment plant from flood during heavy rains. Two big-
gest issues both in the region and in its cities are traffic and energy 
production. 
 In Southwest Finland, some major traffic projects that aim to in-
crease sustainable ways to move and to reduce greenhouse gases 
are being planned. One of them is a one-hour-train from the city of 
Turku to the city of Helsinki that is regionally one of the most important 
goals from both environmental and economic perspectives. The fast 
train would combine these cities as one big working area reducing the 
use of private cars and thereby emissions. The government of Finland 
has already decided to fund the planning of the fast train. Another rail 
project planned in the region is a city tramway in Turku that would 
increase the use of public transport and reduce greenhouse gases 
caused by the traffic in the city area. The use of buses is already in in-
crease due to the investments in the most used lines, public transport 
benefits and cooperation in the area. The operation of first electric 
buses will start in Turku in autumn 2016 and there is a growing num-
ber of electric cars in the city region - not to mention electric bicycles 
that have recently become popular.
 The biggest producer of climate emissions in Southwest Finland 
is the energy. There is a plan to replace nearly all fossil fuel with re-
newable energy sources by 2040, when for instance the city of Turku 
claims to become a carbon neutral city. New housing that uses so-
lar energy is on its way. In heat generation, an important source of 
energy is wood which however is not widely available in Southwest 
Finland that is a region of fields rather than forests. Therefore, the 
answer of clean energy production is not totally clear yet and needs 
to be paid attention also in the future.
 Southwest Finland has wanted to be a forerunner in climate poli-
tics, because, despite the global nature of climate change, its effects 
are extremely local everywhere in the world, also in the northern re-
gions. Especially cities and regions have an enormous possibility to 
promote sustainable and climate friendly solutions in energy produc-
tion and consumption, traffic and city planning to solve the challenges 
of global warming. The closer to people the choices are, the easier 
they are to make. Therefore, the role of cities and regions cannot be 
exaggerated. The targets have been set, the strategies written and 
the politics decided in Southwest Finland to manage climate change. 
Now it is time to act. 
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Baltic Rim universities: excellence, 
economic growth and future 
challenges
Universities reach the coasts of the Baltic Sea in the 15
th 
century – Rostock in (1419), Greifswald (1456), Uppsala 
in (1477) and Copenhagen (1479). The eastern coast got 
its first academic settlements roughly a hundred years 
later – in Königsberg (1544) and Tartu (1632) respectively. 
Early days of universities saw them as places of religious, legal or 
medical professional training, gradually this mission was replaced by 
spreading political or ideological influence and further, starting from 
the 19th century, universities were increasingly seen also as institu-
tions of nation building. Since the 80s of the last century, in addi-
tion to the growing public demand for higher education, there is a 
widespread belief that universities act as engines of economic growth 
and regional development and thus last decades saw a great number 
of smaller regional colleges emerge. As of today Baltic universities 
number in hundreds among global 20-25 thousand and the global 
numbers are still growing. Growth in quantity and increased (interna-
tional) mobility of students has been accompanied by questions about 
academic quality and increasingly also excellence of our academic 
institutions and globalization has raised these issues in a truly global 
perspective. How do Baltic rim universities stand in these compari-
sons and were they are heading?
 By large we may conclude that strong academic traditions to-
gether with national social and economic policies have resulted in 
extremely competitive universities. The most cited ranking, that of 
Quacquarelli-Symonds (topuniverities.com), has rated thousands of 
institutions and ranked 916 of them – that constitutes roughly 5% of 
all world universities. True, Baltic universities do not rank in top 10 or 
even top 50 since these places are taken mainly by US-UK institu-
tions largely due to their global outreach and English being the post-
second-world-war lingua franca of the academe. But further down the 
list we find altogether 30 Baltic universities in this “top 916 list” (we 
have not counted German and Polish institutions for they are more 
often related to the Central-European academic space rather than 
Nordic-Baltic, but we have involved Sankt-Petersburg University and 
SP Polytechnic University into this region (see Map). Most remark-
ably, and differently from most countries, these institutions cater for a 
large majority of the total student body in corresponding countries and 
therefore the overall academic standing of the Nordic-Baltic higher 
education is arguably most competitive, for in other regions top institu-
tions represent a much smaller share of all institutions and therefore 
the average standing is more modest (remarkable exceptions being 
Switzerland, Israel and Singapore).
 
 It is easy to see, that the ranked universities on the eastern coast 
of the Baltic Sea do not reach the best 300 but it is important to notice 
that less than ten years ago none of them were present in the global 
rankings. The academic progress after 50 years of forced separation 
from the global academic community has been nevertheless remark-
able and some of them may well end up in the top 200 in the next 
decade. 
 It is noteworthy, that there is a clear correlation between academic 
standing of universities and level economic development. More inter-
estingly, this correlation is evident not only on the national, but also on 
the regional(!) level. Following the trends over the last few decades, 
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we may observe the emergence of three regions of academic excel-
lence – Öresund, Stockholm and Helsinki metropolitan areas. Differ-
ently from the European historic tradition of small university towns, 
away from business and trade, modern leading universities tend to 
grow in an economically thriving environment offering challenging 
partnerships and global outreach. In this context, it is understandable, 
that eastern coast institutions have to push for academic excellence 
together with their national economies and build local and regional 
partnerships for mutually beneficial advancement.
 In this context, one may ask if universities first contribute to eco-
nomic growth or, vice versa, economic growth contributes directly to 
academic advancement. Most probably, this relationship is a truly in-
terrelated one and we have to take this into account in order to avoid 
unfounded expectations and related disappointments from misguided 
academic investments.
 Furthermore, if the above said is true, the regional economic en-
vironment is so important that strategic planning of universities can-
not avoid taking these realities into account. Basically, it brings to a 
conclusion, that academic ambitions of universities must be aligned 
to and coordinated with the neighboring outside world much more 
strongly than usually accepted.
 This, in turn, means that global rankings lose relevance for univer-
sities outside of the global economic hotspot regions. This, however, 
does not reduce their importance on the regional scale provided they 
define and implement their academic mission in the corresponding 
way.
 The world of universities develops in circles – national borders 
have disappeared in recent decades giving us a global pool of most 
diverse institutions, which we have tried to rank one way or the other. 
These rankings make sense in the case of global brands but for the 
large majority of universities we have to pay much more attention to 
the regional aspects and contexts developing also corresponding cri-
teria for a sensible comparison of different institutions.
 Going this way we may well find, that some university outside the 
established metropolitan areas, and not yet on the global ranking list, 
turns out to be a real powerhouse.  
J a a k  A a v i k s o o
Rector, Professor
Tallinn University of Technology
Estonia
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University cooperation in the Baltic 
Sea region – after 25 years
L a r s  R y d é n
Today we can look back at 25 years of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, made possible after the dramatic events 1989-91, with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. It spurred a very wide range of contacts and network building. An upsurge of voluntary associations 
formed by all kinds of groups. Gunnar Lassinanti estimated 2013 that 
there were between 200 and 300 networks in areas from finance to 
culture, most of them formed during the early 1990s. One kind was 
university cooperation. 
 One of the earliest university networks was the Conference of Bal-
tic University Rectors, CBUR, an initiative by Lund University. Their 
first meeting was congregated in Visby Gotland in September 1991 
in the presence of the Swedish King and Queen. At the same time 
the Baltic University Programme, BUP, created by Uppsala University, 
developed. The first meeting of BUP in Kalmar, Sweden, in February 
1991, just weeks after the scaring attack on Vilnius on January 13, 
gathered no less than 34 universities hungry for contacts and uncer-
tain how to act, not knowing much about each other. BUP started 
satellite TV broadcasts in October the same year. Before the time 
of Internet it was the best option for regional communication. In the 
following years several other university networks formed on the ini-
tiative from among others Turku, Finland, Tartu, Estonia and Berlin, 
Germany. 
 One may believe that today, 25 years later, when international 
contacts are normal for practically any university, the networks fo-
cussed on the region may be unnecessary and outdated. For some 
networks this is what happened. Thus the CBUR stopped working 
after 10 years. Several of the other networks turned into educational 
projects, offering Baltic Sea Region Studies. 
 However the Baltic University Programme is still very active and 
there are no signs of “closing the shop and going home”. The pro-
gramme is very much wanted by the participating universities. Up to 
now 230 universities and other institutes of higher education have 
participated over the years. On the contrary BUP is today becoming 
a permanent organisation with members, with secretariats in several 
countries and permanent activities, and a very wide range of educa-
tional materials. BUP focuses on sustainable development and edu-
cation for sustainable development, but has also staged a number of 
research collaborations, and applied projects with other actors, such 
as authorities, cities, industry, etc. 
 Another sign that the value of regional university cooperation 
persists is the formation of the Baltic Sea Region University Network 
(BSRUN) in 2000 in Turku promoting collaboration in University Gov-
ernance, Management and Administration. It is active and running. 
Regional cooperation is seen in many other arenas, not the least busi-
ness, and universities play a role in many of them. The European 
Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) was approved by 
the Union in 2009. It was the first macro-regional strategy in Europe, 
made possible by the enlargement of the Union in 2004. Here BUP 
is a so-called Flagship in the policy area education. Another Flagship 
in this Policy Area is the recently started Baltic Science Network, initi-
ated by Hamburg, with many universities involved. 
 The strategy of regional cooperation is thus today rather getting 
stronger than the opposite, but partly for different reasons than at the 
end of the Cold War and the break-down of the Iron Curtain. The sup-
port of neighbours is a valuable asset in a world where competition 
is harsh and the local situation is priority. Many universities in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is still not strong enough when competing 
with Western Europe or even less so globally. They need cooperation 
which does not build only on competence. The strongest universities 
typically are part of global networks with elite participation, and not 
always interested in regional networks. 
  A comment which is regretfully necessary to add here is the de-
creased participation of Russia in this network building. After 25 years 
of trustful dialogue Russian cities are not very active in e.g. the Un-
ion of Baltic Cities any longer. Its universities are also decreasing its 
participation in the Baltic University Programme. It remains a part of 
the Council of Baltic Sea States, but not always participating. The 
increasing tensions between Russia and the rest of the region is re-
gretful and alarming. We can only hope it will not get worse. 
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Making transport deliver for the 
Baltic Rim
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 2 6
to the railway network of Poland and Germany. However Rail Baltic 
will see European width railway connect Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
but equally Finland and Poland to each other as well as to the other 
countries of the European Union. 
The Fehrman Belt Link 
Another major project which will have a positive impact in the Baltic 
Rim, is the construction of the The Fehrman Belt. This link will connect 
Denmark with Germany and will remove a cross-border bottleneck by 
the construction of the new immersed rail/road tunnel under the 19 
km wide Fehmarn strait between Denmark and Germany, reducing 
travel time between Copenhagen and Hamburg for passengers by 
one hour and for rail freight transport by approximately two hours. The 
total construction cost of the Fehmarn Belt fixed link is expected to be 
approximately €5.4 billion. The EU provided €204 million for studies 
and works as part of the TEN-T programme, in the 2007-2013 funding 
period. In 2014, the CEF allocated a further €589 million.  
* * *
Ports are a key part of our transport infrastructure. The EU is sup-
porting Baltic ports in three corridors: Baltic-Adriatic, North Sea-Baltic 
and Scandinavian-Mediterranean, as well as under the Motorways of 
the Sea programme.  Thanks to the CEF, we will have committed just 
over €1 billion in grants to ports and their connections by the end of 
2016. €501 million of this will directly or indirectly benefit Baltic ports. 
 Although it is relatively easy to travel across Europe by road, 
there are outstanding issues to be tackled. In this regard, the Com-
mission hopes to present a set of road initiatives in 2017. Its main 
aims will be to clarify and simplify the rules to reduce administrative 
burden for haulage services travelling across the continent, to ensure 
good enforceability of EU law in all states, to provide a level-playing 
field for operators.  Cabotage rules, conditions for stable establish-
ment, opening of passenger market, access to bus and coach termi-
nals and road charging are other specific issues to be addressed. The 
road initiatives will ensure the Baltic region is better connected to a 
strengthened EU road system. 
 Given its nature, aviation is perhaps the sector most depend-
ent on  cross-border cooperation. The Aviation Strategy for Europe, 
launched less than 12 months ago is already delivering for Europe. 
Through it, the Commission will ensure that European Single Aviation 
Area continues to develop in order to be able to compete with fast-
growing aviation markets such as the Middle East or Asia. Connectiv-
ity for the Baltic region with the rest of Europe and the world is essen-
tial. With air passenger numbers continuing to grow, issues around 
capacity and congestion will also need to be overcome. Enhanced 
connectivity would serve the economy, businesses and people better. 
Transport is a key driver of the European and the Baltic economy. In Europe, 1 out of 20 jobs is in the transport sector, providing direct employment for more than 11 mil-lion Europeans. We depend on the sector every day, be it for work or play, to ensure our shops are re-stocked, or 
that a patient can be brought to the hospital on time. When it works 
well, transport as a subject is largely in the background. However, 
when there is a failing in the system, such as traffic congestion, or a 
delayed flight, or an accident, questions are immediately asked about 
the functioning of the transport system. 
 The European Commission and more specifically DG MOVE is 
tasked with finding answers to that question – How could the transport 
system work better, especially on cross-border journeys? Transport 
is the backbone of our economy, so it is worth investing time, energy 
and money into the network, in order to make transport work better for 
all of us.  
 Close cooperation and collaboration on cross-border projects 
yields huge returns, allowing the free-flow of goods and people be-
tween countries. Going it alone can mean the return on infrastructure 
investment is severely diminished. For instance, there is little value in 
upgrading ferry port facilities in Helsinki to take bigger vessels if the 
port at Tallinn or Stockholm cannot handle the larger ship. Similarly 
there is little value in Latvia building a four-lane highway, only to meet 
a country lane in Estonia or Lithuania. 
 To address these issues, and to get the maximum return for each 
euro spent, the EU has developed the Trans-European Network. It 
aims to eliminate bottlenecks at borders across Europe, facilitating 
the free-flow of passengers, goods and services. Its main funding 
instrument is the Connecting Europe Facility or CEF, worth about 
€24.05 billion between 2014 and 2020. 
 We have also learned that once the borders are lifted and cross-
border transport can operate freely, the benefits are quick and im-
minent for businesses and for people. Where cross-border obstacles 
still remain, the progress and benefits are limited. It is essential to 
make sure that cross-border transport is smooth and efficient, if we 
want to reap all benefits that transport can offer. Rail Baltic and the 
Fehrman Belt link are two major projects worth highlighting in more 
detail. 
Rail Baltic  
Rail Baltic is an excellent example in cross-border cooperation. This 
joint project between the Baltic States, Poland and Finland is being 
largely funded by the CEF. It is the largest infrastructure project ever 
undertaken in the history of the Baltic States, and under the CEF it 
has received around €750 million, of EU co-funding available under 
the respective national allocations of the Baltic States.  The current 
Baltic railway network and train carriages cannot be used to connect 
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 Research and Innovation programmes are critical to make the 
transport network sustainable and safer. R&I will also help Europe to 
remain competitive in the face of tough global competition. Develop-
ing new and innovative solutions is an opportunity to be seized. In Air 
Traffic Management, innovative solutions through SESAR are helping 
to cut congestion, optimise the use of existing (and expensive) infra-
structure, as well as cutting emissions. On the rail network, the ERT-
MS signalling system is making our rail network safer, but it is also fast 
becoming a gold standard across the world. There are other develop-
ments too, such as introducing fully interoperable e-tolling systems 
on our roads and developing standards for connected vehicles and 
connected infrastructure. All of this is in addition to the Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation programme ever with nearly €80 billion of 
funding available over 7 years (2014 to 2020). 
H e n r i k  H o l o l e i
Director-General for Mobility and 
Transport 
European Commission
 Despite the clear benefits, cooperation and collaboration is not 
always easy.  Different administrations have different ideas, budgets 
and political priorities, but things are improving. The bigger picture is 
important, and although alone we might move faster, together we go 
much further. That is a message that every policy maker should keep 
in their minds.   
To receive a free copy, 
register at www.utu.fi/pei
P a n - E u r o p e a n  I n s t i t u t e
1 8
B a l t i c  R i m  E c o n o m i e s3 1 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 I S S U E  #  4
www.utu . f i /pe i
The Arctic – a strategic priority for 
ICES
“ .  Science recognises no boundaries, no class and no creed, all ‘‘ working to a common end, to increase knowledge and to uplift humanity” (Johannes Schmidt)The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
agreed to provide a special report in 2018 on climate change, oceans 
and the cryosphere, an acknowledgement of the major changes in the 
marine ecosystem as a consequence of Arctic warming and the pace 
at which it occurs.  
 Through the proposition of an international study of the Arctic 
Ocean, the region was a priority for the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in the years leading up to the formal 
creation of the organization in 1902. One hundred years later, a re-
inforcement of this commitment saw a decision to enhance scientific 
activities in Arctic waters. ICES, with the Arctic coastal states as five 
of its 20 members, has since outlined its approach for work in the area 
and the development of its science, advice, and data (Strategic Plan 
2014-2018).
 More widely our organization’s goal is to advance scientific knowl-
edge on the marine ecosystem and environment, fisheries and aqua-
culture, and using this knowledge to provide unbiased, non-political 
advice on the corresponding issues to Member Countries, and inter-
national governmental institutions like the EU Commission, Regional 
Fisheries Management Bodies, and Regional Seas Environmental 
Commissions. The work represents the endeavour and expertise of 
hundreds of scientists across tens of countries around the world. 
 This development and coordination of science and provision of 
advice to support governance extends to the Arctic, where aquatic 
resource use and the impact of human activity on the ecosystem are 
at the centre of efforts.  
Arctic partners
ICES is working on Arctic issues, coordinating and developing sci-
ence as well as providing advice on fish stocks. Strategically our or-
ganization seeks input from partners such as the Arctic Council on 
how to address research gaps and needs.
 Bridges have been built with Arctic Council working groups the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) and the Pro-
tection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), as well as the In-
ternational Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Sustained Arctic 
Ocean Observation Network (SAON), and the North Pacific Marine 
Science Organization (PICES).
Action areas for scientific cooperation
The Central Arctic Ocean is one of eight ecoregions for which ICES is 
producing integrated ecosystem assessments. Based on these as-
sessments, condensed ecosystem overviews for the Barents Sea, 
Celtic Sea, North Sea, Bay of Biscay and Iberian Sea, were delivered 
at the beginning of 2016. The Central Arctic Ocean is one of the re-
maining ecosystem overviews currently in development.
 ICES data services provide the core evidence base for marine 
assessments; for example, the Contaminants and Biological Effects 
dataset is closely tied to AMAP. This includes potential further coop-
eration on a hazardous substances assessment tool, which would 
generate on-demand a dataset product from our databases.  
 For more than a decade the organization has produced a report 
from the ICES Area of the North Atlantic and Nordic seas describing 
the state of and trends in ocean climate. This report is also avail-
able as an operational data tool on the ICES website. 
 ICES furthermore, provides advice for a number of fish stocks, 
including capelin, cod, northern shrimp, and harp and hooded seal. 
 The Arctic marine environment will undergo major changes in the 
coming decades due to on-going climate change and increases in 
human activities, and ICES has the capability to provide better under-
standing of ecological processes and human impacts on this ecosys-
tem. 
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 2 7
A n n e  C h r i s t i n e 
B r u s e n d o r f f
General Secretary 
International Council for the  
Exploration of the Sea
Copenhagen, Denmark
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Maritime policy at a global arena
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 2 8
Maritime transport is fundamental for the global economy. It is argued that some 80 to 90 per cent of global trade is carried by sea. Maritime traffic has increased signifi-cantly over recent decades. 
 Not only the vessel fleet, but also maritime infrastructure contin-
ues to be developed. It is obviously true when it comes to ports. During 
the last few years, investments in fairway infrastructure are evident. 
New canals in Suez and Panama constitute global megaprojects. A 
Baltic aspect of the New Panama Canal that seldom is discussed is 
the fact that New Panamax (depth 15.2 m) more or less will dovetail 
with the Baltimax (depth 15.4 m). While many ports, particularly over-
seas, have invested heavily to dredged and “pave the (fair-)way” for 
New Panamax, the Baltic Sea can welcome those vessel, just as it is! 
In other words, during the coming years we will see a global vessel 
fleet better optimized for Baltic conditions than we ever have seen. Of 
course, it may imply considerable challenges for ports to adapt. 
 The EU Sulphur Directive, implemented in 2015, in areas such 
as the Baltic and the North Sea, but not globally, has been debated. 
Transport Analysis have followed the implementation and commis-
sioned interviews with key stakeholders. The study demonstrates 
that, overall, respondents have made few adaptations. Most transport 
buyers indicate that they have not modified their transport arrange-
ments, but some have switched to other modes. Uncertainties about 
fuel prices, the maturity of new technologies, and future regulations 
have led most shipping lines to postpone new investments. However, 
more ship-owners have begun to order scrubbers to clean the ex-
haust gas. The cost of sea transport in SECAs has risen 5 to 10 per 
cent, according to interviewees. The Swedish Government has also 
asked Transport Analysis to look into the likely introduction of a ni-
trogen emission control area, NECA, in the Baltic Sea and the North 
Sea. 
 While the global as well as the EU-fleet tends to grow, the Swed-
ish-registered tonnage decreases somewhat. However, at the same 
time the fleet controlled by Swedish interests increases. In 2015 the 
Swedish Government Offices published a National Marine Strategy in 
order to clarify aims and set out future initiatives for maritime transport 
and the marine sector. Sweden is to strive to offer the best regulatory 
framework in Europe for shipping.  The transfer of goods from land 
trans¬port to sea transport can help to redu¬ce the overall environ-
mental impact of the transport sector.
 Transport Analysis has a permanent commission to follow the 
competitiveness of maritime shipping. The overall impression is that 
the conditions for the Swedish merchant fleet has developed appro-
priately over the last few years. Currently, we see a number of im-
provements for the industry: The introduction of tonnage tax, a special 
effort to simplify regulations for the shipping industry, an expansion of 
the Swedish Maritime Support Scheme and the introduction of del-
egated inspections. The Swedish development on rules and regula-
tions is mirrored by other countries. Most nations strive for increasing 
tonnage in their registers and we are all pulled into the swirl of regula-
tory competition.
 A progressive policy on Research and Innovation is an important 
element of the Maritime Strategy. R&I initiatives should also stimulate 
the maritime equipment industry. It covers a broad range of activities 
with close links to areas in which Sweden have, or strive for, a strong 
position. To this end, trade and export policy are also important, such 
as the development of platforms for marketing and communication. 
 At a time when the autonomous technology has been widely 
utilised across various fields, including transportation, the shipping 
industry may come to face a paradigm shift. A shift that can allow 
for improved safety, lower fuel consumption and better environmental 
performance, richer data provision and longer maintenance intervals. 
 Fair pricing is a fundamental principle of Swedish transport policy. 
Ideally, taxes and charges should reflect the social external marginal 
cost of transports. Transport Analysis annually report on this issue, 
involving a European perspective. On the one hand side we conclude 
that the limited taxes and charges levied on maritime traffic does not 
make up for its external costs, basically the environmental costs. On 
the other hand side, taxes and charges typically need to increase 
more for other modes of transport, to put them all at equal footing.
 All in all, seen from a transport policy perspective we see great 
progress. Typically, maritime transport services are better than ever. 
Safety has improved from an already good standard and the pace of 
environmental improvements has probably never been higher. Obvi-
ously, future challenges relates to industry policy rather than to trans-
port policy objectives. But, as we all know: Prediction is very difficult, 
especially when it is about the future…  
B r i t a  S a x t o n
B r i t a  S a x t o n
Director General 
Transport Analysis
Sweden
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Oily risks of Gulf of Finland
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 2 9
World lives on oil. This is especially the case with Rus-sia, where, in 2012, oil- and gas sector accounted for 16 % of GPD and more than 70% of exports. For Russia, Gulf of Finland (GoF) is an important route of export, being peaceful option compared to southern 
options. Every day 20 tankers pass the Gulf of Finland, which is a nar-
row area with intensive traffic. The existing risk analyses suggest that 
large oil spills are matter of time. 
 For Finland, the development of Russian oil transportation creat-
ed a risk that cannot be controlled. Finland needs to adapt to the risk. 
This is demanding as building a lot of human activities to a small area 
has created unforeseen risks. There are three nuclear power plants in 
the GoF, and after a ship accident the leaking oil can spread to cooling 
system, which can create severe problems. Especially such oil, which 
spreads below the surface, is impossible to keep outside the cooling 
system with oil booms. After discussions with FEM research group in 
University of Helsinki, STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) 
realized that this risk needs to be taken into account, and the nuclear 
power plant in Loviisa got a new construction to be able to take cool-
ing water from the eastern side for periods of maintenance service, 
which are critical periods. FEM realized the risk when assessing what 
would happen for the bird islands if oil passes underneath the booms. 
  Compared to any other Baltic Sea country, Finland has invested a 
lot in oil combatting fleet. In GoF, the usual directions of wind are such 
that in an oil spill accident, the likely direction of the spreading oil is 
along Finnish coast.  Moreover, the coastline is long and ragged with 
a lot of islands and bays, providing a variety of habitats for species. 
On the other hand, GoF is a difficult environment for the cleaning of 
shoreline.
 It is challenging to estimate in advance, how big the ecological 
damages could be in different sizes of accidents. The environmental 
settings (wind strength and direction, ice conditions, etc.) vary a lot 
and they have an important effect on the impacts of oil accidents. For 
example the damages on sea birds are to some extent unpredictable: 
in France in 1978 the oil leakage from Amoco Cadiz -tanker was 230 
000 tons, but the total number of dead birds was “only” 20 000. On 
the other hand, a relatively small oil leakage (10 tons) from a small 
vessels close to Gotland waters in Baltic Sea killed 60 000 birds. 
 The commercial values of e.g. Finnish species in GoF are low 
compared to the value of oil business. The value of the load of one 
tanker is easily tens of millions of euros. This is much more than the 
value of e.g. yearly herring catches in GoF. However, the costs of 
cleaning can be up to billion dollars.  The Finnish citizens have a high 
willingness to pay for prevention of an oil accident. In a case of a 
large accident, insurance companies, Finnish Oil Pollution Compen-
sation Fund and International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds do 
not cover all the costs.  The taxpayers will pay the rest, i.e. we carry 
the risk of Russian oil export. 
 Due to the only partial possibility to directly control the risk, there 
is an obvious need to use scientific tools to create a maximum interest 
among shipping companies and insurance companies to avoid oil ac-
cidents. For example, the returning of a lost species back to GoF can 
be very costly.  All such costs must be estimated in advance to make 
actors realizing what the total costs and biological damages can be. 
 The negative publicity seems to be the most important factor cre-
ating the interest to avoid accidents among the involved companies. 
However, this is likely the case with large international oil companies, 
and not necessarily with small shipping companies, which do not have 
similar PR value. In the oil damage databases (which species have a 
risk to be lost in a case of a spill) of Gulf of Finland there are also pho-
tos of the species to make it concrete what the potentially lost species 
look like. In order to estimate population losses, these databases are 
used together with spatially specific accident probabilities and models 
that describe the spread of oil in different weather settings.  
 The main part of the nature conservation in Finland is focusing 
on the safeguarding of rare and threatened species. In their genes, 
they have such information which is easily not possible to get back if 
once lost. There is no similar environment in the world as the brackish 
water of Baltic Sea is. In GoF, there are about 70 species, which live in 
such a microhabitat that oil spill can destroy many of the populations. 
There is a risk to loose permanently some genetically unique species 
in an accident, whereas e.g. rainbow trouts in aquaculture are easy to 
replace. Moreover, the insurance companies pay these damages.   
 International Maritime Organization has declared Baltic Sea to 
be particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA), except the Russian area. 
This demonstrates that the uniqueness of the nature of the area has 
been acknowledged. In GoF, several investments to safety have been 
made. These include: 1) International AIS (Automatic Identification 
System) system, which identifies the name of the vessel, type of the 
vessel and place and direction 2) VTS (Vessel Traffic Service) author-
ity offers, for vessels, information about traffic of the area and other 
relevant information having impact on safety 3) International Manda-
tory Ship Reporting System that provides additional information about 
vessels entering GoF.  As can be seen, quite a lot has been done, but 
if we compare the standards to those of aviation, it is obvious that a 
lot more could still be done. For example the learning from close by 
accidents is very poor in shipping. 
 Even though GoF is a well studied area where approximately 20 
scientific papers have been published about oil spill risks and decision 
making, there is still a hard decision to be made: do we safeguard an 
aquaculture unit, beaches or beetles? Such decisions are difficult for 
those persons who are in charge of oil combatting activities after an 
accident and oil spill.  It would be better to include the aims of decision 
making to legislation. Agreed aims and criteria would allow decision 
analysis to support the demanding decision making after a large scale 
oil spill.   
S a k a r i  K u i k k a
S a k a r i  K u i k k a
Professor in Fisheries Biology
Kotka Maritime Research Centre
University of Helsinki
Finland
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Tanker spill risk in the Gulf of 
Finland: dire consequences, high 
uncertainty 
In the Gulf of Finland there are 6000 -7000 tanker calls every year. Of these around 1000 call at Finnish harbors. These tankers carry everything from crude oil to petroleum products to chemicals, with around a third of the tankers calling into Finnish harbors carrying chemicals. While the oil tanker spill risk is common knowledge, the 
risk posed by chemical tankers has been largely been ignored in the 
public discourse.
 Luckily so far no tanker accident has led to a catastrophic envi-
ronmental disaster due to a spill of oil or chemicals, but unfortunately 
this seems to be only a matter of time: The average period between 
tanker groundings is once roughly every 2 years according to statis-
tics for the Finnish GoF only. 
 Tanker spills are potentially high consequence, low occurrence 
but high uncertainty events. The uncertainty here refers both to the 
high variance of historical accidents in the Gulf of Finland as well as 
the lack of understanding in the scientific community in modelling ac-
cident frequency and consequences. 
 There are several key issues when it comes to analyzing maritime 
risk: Accident underreporting is a serious issue - even in the Nordic 
countries. Roughly half of all accidents are estimated to go unreported 
(or alternatively be lost somewhere in the system). Thus any analysis 
based on accident statistics is incomplete. To which extent this affects 
only minor damages is uncertain.
 When it comes to groundings, there are several methods avail-
able for estimating grounding damage. These, however suffer from 
the fact that the actual bottom shape is not very well known; only little 
research has been done so far and the rock models used in litera-
ture are too simplified to realistically correspond to actual sea bottom 
shapes, which is one of the most critical inputs required for grounding 
damage modelling.
 For collisions ship bows are known to a higher level of detail but 
the exact “how often” and “where” are not as there are major simpli-
fications being made the ship collision modelling: Utilizing different 
assumptions regarding how ships behave in the moments up to col-
lision lead to different accident patterns and frequencies in the Gulf 
of Finland. These factors – just to name a few – mean that there is 
medium-to-high uncertainty of the risk estimates. 
 Despite this, uncertainty of maritime risk is rarely discussed in 
the scientific literature. This can lead to problems higher up in the 
decision-making chain: Researchers presenting numbers backed up 
by fancy-looking mathematical equations and references to scientific 
publications easily create an illusion of accuracy and reliability to peo-
ple higher up in the decision-making chain. This leads to a false sense 
of trust in the numbers, which themselves in maritime risk analysis are 
usually subject to medium-to-high uncertainty 
 When you are presented with numbers regarding how often acci-
dents are predicted to happen and what the spill sizes are, you should 
ask critical questions such as “how realistic are these numbers?”, 
“how reasonable are the assumptions and simplifications made in 
the modelling process?” and most importantly “how do the aforemen-
tioned affect the results?”. 
 As tanker accidents are high impact-high uncertainty events, risk 
mitigation measures should be more designed around a robust re-
sponse thinking instead of being designed around expected values 
such as ones derived from a cost-benefit analysis as the expected 
accident frequencies and consequences are highly uncertain. Con-
ducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is also practically very 
difficult to do as exploring the effects of all potential risk mitigating 
measures is practically challenging or impossible. 
 Robust in this sense means having the capability of respond-
ing effectively to a wide range of spills in the Gulf of Finland utilizing 
various collection and containment methods. Such an approach is 
to some extent adopted in the HELCOM recommendations, where 
member states are obliged to certain oil spill recovery capacity and 
speed standards. The collection of spilled oils is much more expen-
sive on the shores than at open sea, which should of course be kept 
in mind when planning the response capacity.
 Preventive measures should, however, not be forgotten but au-
thorities should have the attitude of “when, where and how much” 
instead of “if ever” when it comes to a major tanker spill in the Gulf of 
Finland.   
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J u h a  N a u k k a r i n e n
Confidence in the emissions trading 
scheme and in the functioning of the 
electricity market must be restored
The price of electricity has stagnated at a low level for years. The situation is expected to last at least for the next few years. With the current price level, it is difficult to carry out market-based investments in new production. Investments can mainly be carried out on the basis of various political 
support schemes. Through the support schemes, more wind and so-
lar power with intermittent production has entered the European mar-
kets. Subsidised production reduces the market price while its costs 
are collected from outside the market.
 Some of otherwise still useable capacity has become unprofit-
able. A significant amount of flexible production, which could be 
used for meeting the fluctuations of production and energy use, has 
been taken out of use, even if the need for flexible production has 
increased. 
 Finland has been among the global forerunners in combined heat 
and power generation. That is a very energy-efficient way to produce 
energy. And it produces energy at a time when the demand for both 
heat and electricity is at its highest. Even cogeneration is now facing 
profitability concerns.  
Our dependence on imported electricity has grown
In the past few years, we have had to cover about one-fifth of our 
electricity use with imports. During the peak last January, we had to 
import almost 30%. Even moderately serious issues in the import 
connections or in our own production could have resulted in major 
disturbances in the availability of electricity.
 The problems in our electricity market are basically pan-Euro-
pean by nature. The energy and climate package for 2020 adopted 
by the European Union in 2007 was largely an unsuccessful set of 
measures in terms of market development. 
 The renewable energy and energy-efficiency targets that com-
pete with the emissions trading scheme did not give enough room 
to manoeuvre for a market-based emissions trading scheme. A well-
functioning energy market and emissions trading scheme would be 
excellent tools in the provision of low-emission, reasonably priced 
energy to society.  
 The EU’s energy and climate package for 2030 now provides bet-
ter opportunities for market recovery and the functioning of the emis-
sion trading scheme.  However, it will be difficult to remedy the prob-
lems that have already arisen. Distrust of the EU’s decision-making 
and of the consistency of the climate policy is hampering the neces-
sary corrective actions. At the same time, confidence in the function-
ing of the electricity market has suffered a blow. And the investments 
achieved through support schemes will have an impact on the market 
for a long time, for the duration of their lifetime.
Confidence must be restored
Confidence in the emissions trading scheme and the functioning 
of the electricity market must be restored. The emissions trading 
scheme must be strengthened, for example, by moving operations 
from outside the emissions trading scheme into the scheme. This can 
take place, e.g. through electrification of traffic and by including heat-
ing in the emissions trading scheme. After that, it will also be easier 
to implement the target of dismantling national support schemes for 
renewable energy.
We are heavily dependent on imported energy
Finland’s high dependence on imported energy can also be regarded 
as an energy policy challenge. In the past few years, our energy trade 
balance has been negative by about EUR 4–7 billion. The greatest 
individual factor has been the imported fossil oil, which accounts in 
value for about 70% of the net imports of energy. 
 The negative energy trade balance burdens and shakes our entire 
trade balance and, consequently, our national economy. 
 Imported fossil oil is also the most significant individual factor in 
terms of our greenhouse gas emissions. Its emissions are as high as 
the emissions of all other fossil fuels put together. 
 The target of the Finnish government’s programme is to halve 
the use of imported oil by year 2030. This target can be achieved by 
improving energy efficiency and by replacing imported oil with indig-
enous biofuels, electricity and district heat in traffic, building-specific 
heating and industrial processes.  
 Although our energy policy involves a number of challenges, 
many things are in fairly good shape here in Finland. 
 The Nordic electricity market is probably the most effective mar-
ket area in the whole of Europe. Finland has the world’s smartest 
electricity grid, which enables sensible and efficient use of electric-
ity. In terms of electricity, we are already well on our path towards a 
carbon-neutral society. As much as 80% of our indigenous electricity 
generation and 90% of the Nordic production is carbon neutral.
 Finland is a world leader in combined heat and power generation. 
We are also among the top countries in Europe in the utilisation of 
renewable energy. 
 All this, and our electric energy is still among the cheapest in Eu-
rope.   
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 1
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J o h a n  D e n n e l i n d
Digitalization provides the Nordic 
and Baltic States with an opportunity 
to build on its leadership
Digitalization is the single most important change in history since the harnessing of steam power or even the invention of the printing press. It is revolutioniz-ing every facet of our lives.     Greater use of enhanced Digital services drives inno-
vation, reduce costs for businesses and consumers; increases pro-
ductivity, access and choice for consumers and generates efficiency 
improvements that reduce negative impacts on the environment from 
economic growth. Digital innovation is part of the solution of 15 of 
the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals, providing a tremendous 
momentum to all countries, both developing and developed. 
 With the arrival of the digital age, the industrial revolution has en-
tered a new phase and as the playing field changes new opportuni-
ties are created. The roll out of the 5G networks will accelerate this 
disruptive development even more. We all know how new technology 
has created new business opportunities, and, as result of that, also 
swept away many classic business models. Netflix, Uber and Airbnb 
are some well-known examples. While the positive implications of the 
digital economy are great, we must keep in mind the various ways in 
which it impacts our current businesses and jobs. Digitalization will, 
like all major changes in society, create winners as well as losers, 
and when the pace of change is fast, it is of utmost importance that 
we continue to develop and adapt. Unfortunately, this is not an easy 
change, and some will not be able to adjust in time. Business leaders 
and politicians might therefore be tempted to try to maintain the status 
quo. Holding back the tide is not possible. 
State of the art infrastructure is key
There are many reasons why the Nordic countries have succeeded 
during the first decades of digitalization. New technology has been 
available for a big part of the population since day one, and individu-
als and organizations have had the interest and resources to try the 
new, be at the cutting edge and move things forward. Not least, we 
have benefited from the early roll out of modern communication net-
works, today reaching almost the entire region. In recent years the 
“fiber fever” has modernized homes, companies and public services 
in Sweden at a pace faster that is amongst the leading in the world. In 
many ways the Nordic and Baltic countries are leaders, but we cannot 
take our current position for granted. As competition rapidly increas-
es, our region must embark on a change journey to remain on top.
 Telia Company is ready to, once again, invest in cutting edge 
communications networks in our markets. In 2018, Stockholm, Tal-
linn, and hopefully a few more cities, will be some of the first to try 
out the new 5G network which, with its ultra-potent capacity will be 
the backbone on which the services of the future are developed. 5G 
will make it possible to send vast amounts of data at a much lower 
latency and higher speeds, enabling a whole range of new solutions 
that today are not even a spark of an idea. But if we are slow in the 5g 
build-out, the development of these inventions will happen elsewhere 
which in turn means that the new companies and the new job oppor-
tunities will emerge far away from us.
 At Telia Company we aspire to make our contribution by to cre-
ate one seamless, borderless, roaming free network that delivers one 
Gigabit per second across the entire Nordic and Baltic region. In parts 
of our geographies, major urban areas, we will aspire to create Terabit 
territories with speeds a thousand times faster than a Gigabit. This is 
a bold ambition but we think being the cradle of digitalization offers us 
an opportunity to become the world’s ‘digital sandbox’. Although, our 
aspiration to build a Gigabit society and Terabit territories is not going 
to happen if we stick with current ways of thinking about our business 
and how it is regulated and perceived. There is a need for shift of mind 
and policy.
A joint responsibility
Even if the 5G network will be crucial to our region, it will take a lot 
more for the Nordic and Baltic countries to remain front-runners. They 
will need to undergo a massive and all-encompassing change jour-
ney in which all part of society participate. Both the public and pri-
vate sectors need far-reaching digitalization strategies, and while a 
fiber connection and a world leading mobile connectivity  will continue 
to be important, today much more is needed. The change must go 
considerably deeper and all individual players -whether public or pri-
vate- must break new ground within their respective fields in order for 
society to remain competitive in its entirety.
The right competences
Education plays possibly the most defining role in ensuring that the 
needs for specific competencies are met. When software engineers 
and other specific competencies can’t be found locally, many com-
panies are forced to go abroad or hold back on development. A lack 
of skilled, digitally led domestic labor is not sustainable for any com-
pany or society that aspires to lead the way for others. Institutions 
for higher education must educate students in the fields sought after 
by the digital economy and schooling during the earlier years must 
ensure that students are equipped with the skills that enable them 
to choose this path. All school leavers should step out into the world 
with advanced digital skills. Not only will these skills be necessary for 
many future professions, but also a prerequisite for living in a digital-
ized society. 
The bigger society 
The Nordic societies are all in need of extensive reform and there is a 
demand for political leadership to make it happen. The Nordic model 
for social services face major challenges when it comes to long term 
financing and staffing. The public has been promised high quality in 
areas including education, security and care, promises that society 
will eventually have difficulties living up to. Digitalization of the public 
sector will reduce costs and increase access and the quality of care. 
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A well-known example is the growing number of people reaching old 
age which is putting health- and geriatric care under pressure. Tel-
ehealth devices enable patients that do not need full time care to be 
monitored remotely, through being able to do simple tests, and help-
ing them to live safely at home, such as through monitoring for falls 
and medication use. This can further reduce hospital admissions and 
potentially the length of stay by supporting earlier discharges. Our 
estimations shows that these devices alone, excluding the impact 
of increased health literacy and other ICT related health outcomes, 
could save €4.9bn and may potentially help reduce untimely deaths 
by 6,000 a year across the Nordics and Baltics in 2021. 
 It will take a whole lot of innovative thinking to create smart digital 
solutions for schools, healthcare and social services in order to in-
crease efficiency and improve quality. To succeed with this we need 
to dismantle rigid regulation and limiting public procurement that bar 
out new inventions. Instead, the public sector needs to be a driving 
force in the digital shift and encourage more innovations. To acceler-
ate this ambition, Telia Company suggest that by 2025: 50 percent 
of patients should be using an e-health or m-health solution as part 
of maintaining a healthy lifestyle. All authorities should aim to have a 
smart cities strategy, which includes the digitalization of public ser-
vices, such as transport. Furthermore, all schools should be offered 
e-learning tools of high educational quality that meets the specific 
needs of each pupil, helping them to reach their full potential.
Everyone on-board
When an entire society changes in such a fundamental way as the 
Nordic and Baltic societies have, and will continue to, it is important 
that everyone is on-board and can interact with the rest of society. As 
health systems and social services become increasingly digitalized 
there is a potential to improve many senior citizens’ lives by mak-
ing crucial digital services more accessible and easy to understand. 
Together we should strive to ensure that all citizens get access to 
free digital training and skills if desired. The public as well as private 
sectors have a great responsibly to make sure everyone is able to 
access our services.
Opportunities through cooperation
Telia Company aspire to continue to be a leader in an ever changing 
market where change is made more rapid through digital solutions. 
Realizing the full potential of digitalization is not something a single 
company can achieve. Our role is at the core of the ecosystem of 
cooperation which will make an ever growing multitude of digital ser-
vices possible. No single company, organization or government can 
achieve this on its own. Already today we cooperate with numerous 
companies of all shapes and forms to offer the best services to our 
customers. I am convinced that partnering is the way forward. It is my 
strong belief that all parts of society will benefit from reaching out to 
one another, this will make the next phase of digitalization even more 
successful. Through more constructive cooperation between private 
companies and public services, relevant regulation and common 
goals, we can achieve sustainable growth which benefit all society. 
We are happy to take a leading role in an ambitious plan to drive 
digital development for all society.   
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 2
J o h a n  D e n n e l i n d
President and CEO 
Telia Company
Sweden
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Poland, an emerging European ICT 
hub?
A r k a d i u s z  M i c h a ł  K o w a l s k i
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are increas-ingly important for international competitiveness, as they are driv-ing innovation in many fields, providing new solutions in different areas of economic and social life. The digitalization of the world economy results in steadily growing share of ICT sector in GDP 
and employment. As for many countries, this trend is followed also 
by Poland, which has experienced fast development of ICT industry 
in recent years. According to Central Statistical Office, the number 
of enterprises hiring 10 or more persons in the ICT sector amounted 
to 2146 in 2014, increasing by 24.5% since 2011. The number of 
employees in this industry was 196.4 thousand, and was higher by 
10.7% in comparison with 2011. The value of net revenues from sales 
in the ICT sector amounted to over 132 billion PLN (about 30 billion 
EUR) in 2014 (with the biggest contribution of services, in particular 
telecommunications), increasing by 8.8% since 2011. These trends 
lead to ask a question if Poland is emerging as a significant European 
ICT hub, or maybe even has the potential to gain a reputation of Eu-
ropean Silicon Valley in the future? 
 Together with examination of the trends related to the develop-
ment of ICT industry at the national level, it is also interesting to fo-
cus the analysis on regional dimension. It is connected with the fact 
that economic activity in high-technology sectors, like ICT, tends to be 
more and more geographically concentrated. This process is driven 
by different types of agglomeration economies and spillover effects, 
facilitating the transfer of technology and diffusion of innovation, 
which are additionally strengthened by proximity to excellent scientific 
and research centers. These observations explain why ICT industry in 
the world economy develops most strongly in clusters, with the most 
notable example of Silicon Valley in California. There are many other 
ICT clusters in different regions, including Scandinavia, for instance: 
the Kista ICT cluster in Stocholm, the Etelä-Suomi (Helsinki) ICT 
cluster, the Oslo and Akershus ICT cluster or the Øresund Region 
ICT cluster. It is also true for Poland, where ICT sector demonstrates 
high spatial concentration around metropolitan areas. This finding is 
confirmed by statistical data showing geographical concentration of 
employment, firms’ incomes, and the number of firms in ICT industry 
in Polish big cities, while the outermost regions remain mostly “infor-
mation deserts”. 
 Spatial polarization of ICT industry and its location mostly around 
Polish metropolitan areas have stimulated the creation of specialized 
regional cluster initiatives. The best examples are: Mazovia ICT Clus-
ter in Warsaw, and Interizon in Gdańsk, appointed in 2015 by the 
Ministry of Economy as 2 out of 9 Key National Clusters (remaining 
7 are from other industries). Emerging ICT cluster initiatives connect 
enterprises, even these competing with each other, in the cooperation 
processes based on the synergy effects. Moreover, significant parts 
of ICT industry concentrated in 7 biggest agglomerations: Warsaw, 
Cracow, Łódź, Wrocław, Tricity (Gdańsk), Poznań, and Katowice, 
function as shared services centers (SSC), offering different types of 
ICT services to foreign clients, mostly from Western Europe, North 
America, and Central and Eastern Europe. It contributes positively to 
the profitability of Polish ICT sector, as net sales revenues from the 
export of ICT production and services amounted to 35 747.90 million 
PLN (around 8 500 million EUR) in 2014 (which means that there 
was more than 10% growth since 2011, with especially high increase 
of around 70% for ICT services). Poland’s geographical location al-
lowing to work with both Asia and America within the same business 
day, together with the favorable balance between costs and quality of 
products and services, are excellent factors increasing competitive 
advantages of Polish ICT sector. 
 Successful development of ICT industry in Poland is strength-
ened by widely available human resources, with about 15 thousand 
computer science graduates entering the market every year. At the 
same time this is a very perspective sector, as the demand for quali-
fied IT specialists continues to grow, reflecting continuous expansion 
of Polish enterprises, and dynamic development of outsourcing and 
shared services centers. Nevertheless, the job market within the sec-
tor remains highly competitive, ensuring good quality of workforce, 
as the average salary is much higher than the national average. To 
conclude, ICT industry is one of the most dynamically growing sectors 
within the Polish economy, with decent fundamentals for further de-
velopment. It is one of the most promising among emerging European 
ICT hubs, however, transformation into a European Silicon Valley will 
be still a long-term process. 
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Z a n e  Š i m e
CBSS science, innovation and 
research agenda: a promising start for 
accelerated cooperation
2016 is a special year for the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) for the following two reasons. First, under the Ice-landic Presidency preparatory works are underway for the 25th anniversary of the Council which will be celebrated in March 2017. Secondly, on 16 June 2016 the first CBSS Sci-
ence Ministerial took place in Kraków, Poland. It was a unique event, 
since for the first time CBSS Member States gathered in order to dis-
cuss in more detail cooperation in science, research and innovation 
across the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). 
 Although this was the first CBSS meeting in such a format, sci-
ence, research and innovation as such are far from being new topics 
to the Council´s work. Rather this meeting testifies to the long stand-
ing efforts of the CBSS to tailor its science, research and innova-
tion agenda in accordance with the specific needs of the BSR. The 
agenda is also modelled to avoid duplicating structures or overlaps 
on the transnational level. 
 It should be noted that the BSR is a vibrant science and research 
area which hosts various internationally renowned research institu-
tions and research infrastructures. Therefore, the CBSS Science Min-
isterial served as a timely occasion to take a panoramic view on the 
existing cooperation in order to translate the initial CBSS mandate 
set out in the 2007 Latvian Chair´s Conclusions “Higher Education 
and Science for Sustainable Development and Competitiveness of 
the Baltic Sea Region” into specific actions. Consequently, the 2016 
Polish Chair´s Conclusions “Baltic Science: Renewing the Commit-
ment to Science/Research Joint Actions in the Baltic Sea Region” 
elaborate on how two recently launched projects “Baltic Science Net-
work” and “Baltic TRAM” (Baltic Transnational Research Access in 
the Macroregion) contribute towards achieving CBSS strategic goals 
in the domain of science, research and innovation.
 Baltic Science Network is the leading transnational forum for 
higher education, science and research cooperation across the BSR. 
It is a platform which gathers relevant transnational, national and re-
gional policy actors. Its embeddedness in the existing BSR govern-
ance structures is further strengthened by its flagship status of the 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) under the Policy 
Area Education, Research, Employability. Further insights in the lat-
est developments of the Baltic Science Network will be presented and 
discussed with relevant stakeholders during the upcoming EUSBSR 
Forum in Stockholm in November 2016.
 Baltic TRAM supports industrial research with synchrotron radia-
tion and neutrons at research facilities in northern Europe. The overall 
goal is to exploit the full potential of advanced research infrastructures 
available in the BSR according to the needs of the business sector. 
One university per country is tasked to coordinate the research and 
measuring orders by the industrial users. Invited companies are of-
fered consultations and access to research facilities to test their ideas. 
If measurements cannot be carried out locally, they are forwarded into 
the Baltic TRAM network. Baltic TRAM is embedded in the macrore-
gional governance. It belongs to the EUSBSR flagship “Baltic Science 
Link” under the Policy Area Innovation. The latest developments of 
the project will be discussed during the Baltic TRAM Opening Confer-
ence in October 2016 in Hamburg.
 The CBSS role in leading the BSR-wide science, research and 
policy agenda is also relevant to the work of the leading internation-
al organisations. On the one hand, multilateral engagement led the 
CBSS is strengthening the external dimension of EU policies and links 
with the states belonging to the European Economic Area, as well as 
EU ties with Russia. Thus, the CBSS also helps to advance the vision 
set out in the recently announced EU Global Strategy. The multi-level 
collaborative relations established among the Baltic Science Network 
partners, as well as Network´s engagement with Russian stakehold-
ers should be named as one of the most telling examples in this re-
gard. 
 On the other hand, CBSS science, research and innovation 
agenda feeds in the UN Sustainable Development Goals, support-
ing the Goal 9 “Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure”. Further on, 
CBSS contribution is relevant to the work of the UN Commission on 
Science and Technology for Development. The UN recognises the 
importance of regional dimension of science, technology and inno-
vation issues with specific focus on creation of policy environments 
that enable research institutions, businesses and industry to come up 
with innovative solutions which would translate in employment and 
economic growth. Consequently, benchmarking analysis on national 
roadmaps for research infrastructures and smart specialization strat-
egies, as well as recommendations to policy makers currently being 
formulated under the leadership of the CBSS Secretariat within the 
Baltic TRAM network will serve as a valuable contribution to the as-
sessment of national innovation systems and modelling of effective 
policy interventions to tackle regional, national and transnational level 
challenges.   
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 4
Z a n e  Š i m e
Communication & Research Coordinator
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The transformational points of post-
crisis development (innovations)
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 5
disks, servers, etc. The competitive positions in this quick changing 
market segment have not yet formed finally. Basically, IT-technology 
and the Internet are beginning to displace other media.
 In the segment of the intellectual property world market of owner-
ship of the right occurs a redistribution of the rights of owners through 
delivery of patents and the sale-purchase of licenses. An increasing 
number of patent applications in various countries suggests that the 
protection of the owners of intellectual property rights has become 
one of the strategic aims both for companies and for individual states.
 At the same time, the following specific trait appears: 1) the 
legal protection of the intellectual property rights owners 2) inspires 
the scientific innovations, and 3) the existence of a patent informs 
other researchers working in the field of new technologies, - about 
availability and elaboration level of the problem of interest to them. 
That is where the main contradiction objectively established between 
the liberalization of international exchange (in fact, encourage intel-
lectual “piracy”) and the legal protection acts for the narrow circle 
of intellectual property rights owners. And Russia is nowise standing 
apart from this world process.
 Beyond that, the importance of patent protection is different for 
various sectors of the economy. So in the pharmacy, investment re-
quired to develop, test and market a new drug is estimated at an 
average of 1 billion US dollars. In the electronics industry and in the 
production of telecommunications, it is much more efficient to classify 
information than get a patent on it, because the life cycle of the prod-
uct in this sector is relatively short, and the use of intellectual ideas 
(developments) by third parties (competitors) is perfectly possible.
 The commercialization of scientific and technical activity is still rel-
evant for Russia. The current situation in Russia with the protection of 
intellectual property rights is similar in some ways to the situation with 
the United States after World War II. At that time, an active budgetary 
financing in the scientific world (universities) was not accompanied 
by the expanded development of innovations, protected by patents. 
This is largely responsible for change of the patent law in the United 
States, and the innovation developers received the right to choose the 
form of ownership for inventions, financed from the budget. The State 
acted as a defender of the rights to the results of scientific research 
and to the small businesses associated with science.
 Western Europe with a delay, but also followed this suit. For 
example, in Germany in 2002 alone, the patent law was amended, 
which motivated closer cooperation between universities and indus-
trial firms.1 
 The relatively high patent activity in the sector of Russian industry 
(161 internal patent applications in a million inhabitants) puts Russia 
on a par with the most developed countries, but, unfortunately, does 
not lead to any major technological shifts (the demand for innovations 
in Russian industry is unreasonably small - only 1 percent of innova-
tions being introduced). And it is not so much a problem of the recog-
nition of rights for industrial property, but in the absence of conditions 
1 Y.A. Varfolomeyeva. Intellectual property in the context of innovative development. 
Moscow, “Os’-89”, 2006 
Even in the post-crisis period after 2008-2009 defined four transformational development points of nation-states, ac-tivation of which is becoming a priority for national regula-tors, engaged in the search for an effective way out of the current situation in the global geo-economic configuration.
Here they are:
1. The relevance of reckoning with fact that the speed of financial 
transactions has increased, but the time of financial operations has 
shrunk.
2. Under the circumstances, and taking into account the possibilities 
of cyber-penetrations, it is necessary to improve information security 
of transactions on financial markets.
3. As the crisis shows the further disparity between rich and poor 
social groups, is needed “the socialization” of society.
4. The uprising of a stage of transition to the cognitive economy, the 
knowledge economy, the economy of informational type.
 Let us consider in more detail the period of post-crisis develop-
ment of the society on the basis of objective conditions of transition to 
cognitive economics (4th transformational point).
 In this regard, we will be of concern with current problem of the 
Russian intellectual property owners market, which is sensitive to the 
Russian segment of the innovative small business. 
 The trend toward globalization of the world economy affected 
largely the process of commercialization of intellectual property, con-
verting into an active mechanism for promoting foreign trade, inter-
national technology transfer. At the same time, differences between 
national patent systems retard the formation of the intellectual prop-
erty global and regional markets, focusing on territorial exclusivity of 
intellectual property rights protection forms. That’s exactly why the 
problem of national patent systems harmonization, advocacy of intel-
lectual property owners in the Eurasian region, special under condi-
tions of Russia’s accession to the WTO, - becomes extremely impor-
tant.
 The development of intellectual property market in the modern 
world proceeds in three main sectors: high-tech products, informa-
tion technology and law. This process is accompanied by a certain 
shift of potential investors interests from the sphere of material pro-
duction to the sphere of research, development and R&D.
 The market of high technology products (technological equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications devices, nanotechnology, etc.) 
is developing quite rapidly and brings considerable profits to lead-
ing manufacturers in various countries. Today already formed certain 
“niches” in this segment of intellectual property, where the main posi-
tions occupied by such countries as the US, Japan, Western Europe 
(mainly Germany, France and Great Britain). All kinds of international 
patent agencies state the most patent activity (proportion of patent 
applications in R & D costs in the industry) in Japan. 
 In the market of information technologies occurs an exchange 
the information contained on paper, audio and video cassettes, laser 
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implementation in the foreign market;
- creation of innovative companies based on research centers and 
cutting-edge university centers, which should be one of the main in-
struments for transfer of intellectual activity results;
- improving the information and consultation to ensure the activities 
of the intellectual property rights owners (legal and natural persons);
- improving the regulatory environment for the state funds activities 
supporting the export activities of innovative enterprises using the re-
sults of intellectual activity.
 In addition, for the transition to widespread use of export-oriented 
results of intellectual activity in the form of innovation, - the following 
items are needed:  -further improvement of the regulatory, scientific 
and methodological supporting of intellectual property rights owners 
implementing the innovative business, including regulatory and legal 
fixing for performer:  scientific technical projects carried out at the 
expense of the budgets of all levels; - intellectual property rights; - for-
mation of mechanism for intellectual property rights transfer to busi-
ness units for introduction of their into economic circulation and for 
use in foreign trade activities; - regulation of accounting, inventory, 
depreciation, valuation regulation and taxation of intellectual activity 
results, including intellectual property; - preparation of normative-
legal acts regulating the supply orders and procurements, promot-
ing the participation of intellectual property rights owners (legal and 
natural persons) in the export of new high-tech products and services 
throughout the territory of the Eurasian Economic Space.
 Some work in this direction, of course, is underway. One of these 
laws is the Law “On Science and State Scientific and Technical Poli-
cy” with the subsequent changes and additions.
 The Federal Law “On the transfer of technology”, currently being 
developed by the Ministry of Education and Science, is aimed at legal 
regulation of the relations connected with the transfer of intellectual 
property and other useful information on the results of scientific and 
technological activities, received from the state budget. The bill de-
fined the form of contractual relationships with the technology trans-
fer, the procedure for registration of intellectual property rights, the 
procedure for regulation of relations in joint innovative research with 
the participation of the state. The adoption of the bill will contribute 
to the development of public-private partnerships in R & D, which is 
in line with in the WTO generally accepted standards, regulating the 
intellectual activity market sector.  
Bibliography:
1. Khasbulatov R.I. Economic - M .: Publisher Yurayt, 2015. S.56-57.
2. Shafiev R.M. Independent newspaper. NG_ENERGIYA, M. number 10 (103), De-
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for the use of such rights. The difference between the situation in Rus-
sia and the post-war situation in the field of technology transfer in the 
US is that the task of the Russian legal system means, in our view, the 
technical acceleration of R & D results, taking into account the protec-
tion on business rights, but not the traditional control or pressure track 
applied to the owners of intellectual property rights.
 In this regard, we can state the following messages, reflecting the 
protection problems of Russian intellectual property rights owners, 
and this permits the definition of state support actions in this area.
1. It has come to our attention that the unjustified desire of the State 
to secure for itself all rights to the results of creative activity, - not only 
does not encourage business innovations, but does not direct busi-
ness owners to introduce results of intellectual activity for manufactur-
ing applications - i.e. intellectual property becomes an attachment 
to the State (one of the types of technology transfer).
2. The shady export of technology and development is grow-
ing. The settlement of this problem will require the establishment of a 
reliable patent protection system and effective tool for the transfer of 
intellectual property rights.
3. Unfortunately, there is no clearly regulated mechanism of using 
previous and existing Soviet trademarks. In this regard, the transac-
tion costs are increasing, due to the re-registration of trademark data 
on the domestic market, and the number of lawsuits is growing:
 The recommendations to improve the conditions for effective pro-
tection of the intellectual property rights owners, taking into account 
Russia’s accession to the WTO, may be as follows:
- timely registration and patent protectable objects, using international 
trademarks registration systems and scientific discoveries, function-
ing in the framework of WIPO;
- active cooperation of the intellectual property rights owners not only 
with international organizations securing property rights, but also with 
the Russian executive authorities regulating the protection of intel-
lectual property rights;
- monitoring of legal acts of foreign countries in order to identify viola-
tions of rights or discrimination against property owners - for subse-
quent activation judicial mechanisms, WIPO and further WTO;
- overseas markets analysis to take measure of the possibility for pro-
motion of Russian products containing objects of intellectual property. 
The analysis can be conducted, including resources of Russian eco-
nomic and trade missions abroad and the expert community.
 But this is not enough for effective protection of the intellectual 
property rights owners in Russia. The system of state regulation of the 
intellectual property commercialization sphere should include items 
such as:
- development assistance in establishment of technology parks at ma-
jor universities and research institutions; development of regulatory 
mechanisms for transfer of intellectual property rights from universi-
ties or research institutions to technology parks, innovation and tech-
nology centers, business incubators;
- creation of regional centers for technology transfer (patents, search 
for investors, protection of intellectual property rights, etc.), decision 
of budget financing problems and choosing the optimal organizational 
and legal form for the independent centers for intellectual property 
R u s l a n  M .  S h a f i e v
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Ukraine and the not-so-successful 
reform process
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 6
 Ukraine has been widely criticized for the high level of corrup-
tion and inability to introduce substantial reforms. To a large extent 
the society’s tolerance to corruption is one of the reasons why the 
anti-corruption measures are so unsuccessful. However, although 
corruption is almost an intrinsic trait of post-Soviet societies, it would 
be fatalistic and wrong to claim that being corrupt is in the mentality 
of Ukrainians or post-Soviets, as many do. The inability to stand up 
against corruption has rather systemic causes and to a large extent 
is related to poverty, lack of democratic traditions, endemic embez-
zlement and mistrust in state institutions that do indeed stem from 
the Soviet experience. But there are examples, like the Baltic States, 
Georgia and elsewhere proving that corruption can be gradually con-
tained and limited, although it is undeniably a slow and on-going pro-
cess. The Danish initiative should engage specialists from the former 
Soviet countries who have undergone similar reform process, as they 
have much deeper understanding about the political and societal pe-
culiarities in the post-Soviet countries. Finally, we should also give 
some credit to Ukraine for the progress that has been made on bal-
ancing the state budget and refinancing the debt, lessening depend-
ence on Russia, re-building police and armed forces, and increasing 
transparency of state institutions. Indeed, high-level trials of corrupt 
state officials have not occurred yet, but nobody expected the reform 
process to be fast or easy.   
A recent public opinion poll carried out by the Sociological Group “Rating” in May-June 2016 demonstrates a danger-ous trend in the Ukrainian society. Not only the support and trust in the state institutions has decreased dramatically, but a general apathy over the political process is evident. 
A clear reason for that is not-so-successful reform process, exem-
plified by resignation of Aivaras Abromavicius, Ukraine’s Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade, due to the covert corruption of 
the state institutions, and Petro Poroshenko’s involvement in Panama 
Papers scandal earlier this year. However, it is also important to keep 
in mind that the economic problems faced by the society dealing with 
a slow, painful and questionably successful reform process and on-
going military conflict also heavily impact the attitudes of the Ukrainian 
society. Some might argue this could lead to yet another revolution. 
 There are several worrying outside factors that could impede the 
pro-European reform process in Ukraine. There is growing scepticism 
in Ukraine’s ability to implement the Minsk peace agreements – an 
argument used by leaders of Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
that are pushing for removal of the sanctions imposed on Russia. Italy 
and Greece have traditionally been pro-Russian, further increasing 
the potential for sanction removal. For now there is still some balance 
due to the clear anti-Russia stance of Angela Merkel; however, with 
the upcoming election in Germany this position could be amended. It 
is extremely important to keep in mind, however, that negative signals 
and lack of support from the EU will lead to a further disappointment 
and stalemate if not reversibility of the reform process in Ukraine, al-
though for now there is a very little risk that Ukraine will once again 
change its foreign policy orientation towards Russia. 
 An important question here is whether there is any real prospect 
of Ukraine’s integration in the EU. The reluctance of the EU to en-
large, the growing populism and pro-Russian sentiments, along with 
the US Prime Minister Joe Biden’s statement that unless Ukraine 
overcomes its problems with corruption soon, the US will reconsider 
its sanctions on Russia, essentially implies that the EU and the US 
could “push the reset button” in their relations with Russia again. In 
such case, Donbas like Abkhazia and Transnistria will remain a frozen 
conflict, impeding Ukraine’s stability and denying its integration in the 
EU or NATO. 
 For now, Ukraine’s heavy reliance on the foreign funds provided 
by IMF and the EU serves as the central motivation for the necessary 
political, legal and economic reforms that were demanded by the civil 
society during the Maidan protests. EU, despite some of its mem-
bers’ inconsistence towards Russia and general reluctance to offer a 
real membership prospect to Ukraine, has introduced a new measure 
aimed at promotion of the rule of law and eradication of corruption. 
The programme, led by Denmark aims to support: anti-corruption in-
stitutions, which have not been successful in prosecuting the corrupt 
members of political elite; the Parliament’s anti-corruption committee, 
which is key to promoting legislative reforms; and the civil society, 
which must lose its tolerance to corruption.
I l v i j a  B r u g e
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Ukraine, Russia & the energy sector: 
from one dependency to another
T a d e u s z  I w a ń s k i
Two and a half years after the so-called Revolution of Dignity and Russian military aggression in the  Crimea and the Donbas, Ukraine managed to diversify sources of gas supplies. Meanwhile however, the country be-came short of the anthracite coal, which is used as a 
fuel in half of Ukrainian convencional power stations. Lack of 
sufficient steps in providing the adequate volume of coal on the 
eve of the heating season reflect both systemic and non-system-
ic challenges the country is facing. 
 Easing the dependence on import of gas from Russia has been 
one of the biggest successes Ukraine has achieved in last two years. 
Whereas in 2014 Russia’s Gazprom supplied 14.5 bcm of gas, and 
5.1 bcm came from the EU, in 2015 the proportions were reversed: 
the EU supplied 10.3 bcm, and Russia 6.1 bcm. This change is the 
result of effective action to increase the opportunities to import gas 
via reverse connections with EU member states, mainly Slovakia, as 
well as the favourable situation on the European gas market. Another 
reason is the decline in gas consumption in Ukraine, by about 22% 
last year, caused by the economic crisis and the loss of control over 
part of the Donbass. Kyiv has also benefited from warmer winters and 
the reduction in global gas prices. As a result, the winter of 2015/16 
may be the first without any gas from Gazprom. On September 22 it’s 
been already 300th day without supplies from Russia. 
 At the same time, Ukraine became more dependent on Russia in 
another energy sector - electricity generation. Already Autumn-Winter 
of 2014 showed that despite the current production capacity exceed-
ing customer needs in Ukraine, the real capacities, their structure and 
transmission capabilities are inadequate to meet the demand. In No-
vember and December of that year, the authorities made an unprec-
edented decision to periodically switch the power off. The direct cause 
was an inability to fully coverage the peak demand. The electricity 
deficit occurred due to objective conditions - low temperatures which 
increased power consumption, and low water levels in the Dnieper 
and Dniester Rivers that limited generation on hydropower plants. An-
other reason was a long-lasting negligence that resulted in obsolete 
infrastructure facilities and transmission networks; shortsighted plan-
ning, and insufficient volume of raw material for the energy production 
accumulated ahead of the heating period. The key reason however, 
turned out to be a deficit of anthracite coal, mined solely on the part 
of the Donbass, which as a result of the war in the spring of 2014, 
came under the control of the pro-Russian so-called separatists. This 
variety of coal is fired in seven out of fourteen Ukrainian conventional 
power plants, including two belonging to state-owned company Cen-
trenerho. Another five power plants remain in private hands.
 In 2014 coal-based power generation had nearly half share of 
electricity production in Ukraine. Lost  mines and coal motherlodes 
have brought about the deepest crisis of the Ukrainian power sector 
since 1991 and forced Ukraine for the first time in its history to import 
anthracite. Sources of such import outside the Donbas are however, 
limited. Only a few countries mine this type of coal: Russia, South 
Africa, Australia, Kazakhstan and the US. In 2014 Ukraine imported 
from abroad about 2.5 million tons of anthracite; in 2015 official import 
decreased to 1.6 million tonnes. Coal import covered the needs only 
partially. The price, quality and logistics of coal supplies from over-
seas territories are unfavorable compared to the supply from the Don-
bass and Russia. The main problems are higher cost (and exchange 
rate due to the volatility of Ukrainian national currency hryvna), the 
characteristics of the imported anthracite, and a long time wait for the 
finalization of the delivery. 
 Therefore to limit the risks of blackouts Ukraine has been forced 
to take politically uncomfortable decisions - to tolerate the illegal im-
port of anthracite coal from the part of the Donbas controlled by Rus-
sian proxies and sign a one year contract with Russian RAO UES for 
electricity supply. First step however, according to few Ukrainian in-
vestigative journalists, was exploited by part of the rulling elite to cre-
ate grey schemes of transporting coal into Ukraine and grow wealthy.
 Aforementioned problems and challenges – both systemic and 
non-systemic ones, as well as corruption opportunities, did not con-
tribute to better planning and more effective preparations by the gov-
ernment on the eve of the heating season 2016-2017. By the end of 
September, Ukraine managed to stock only 1.2 million tonnes com-
pared to approx. 2.8 million necessary according to government’s 
estimations. And probably the risk of blackout in the winter time will 
again depend on weather. 
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Growth or war: familiar challenges in 
Russian governance
Y u v a l  W e b e r
Russia’s annexation (or “absorption”) of Crimea and spon-sorship of anti-government insurgents fighting a civil war in the eastern parts of Ukraine have strategic, proximate causes — the fear that a post-Maidan Ukraine would not only not join the Eurasian Economic Union, which Russia 
sought as a base for building “Eurasia” into a pole of international 
affairs — but also reflect very old fears for Russian leadership: insta-
bility anywhere the country has external interests will eventually, but 
inexorably, lead to instability for the leadership at home. The war in 
Ukraine does not exist because Vladimir Putin is the leader of Russia, 
but because the Russian political system has remained fundamentally 
similar across various regime types (absolutist monarchy, socialism, 
weak democracy, electoral authoritarianism) wherein formal political 
institutions and hidden informal politics coexist on a contingent basis. 
That system impels Russian leaders to expand external influence to 
justify internal political consolidation, yet a formal policy challenge or 
defeat anywhere weakens the Russian leader’s ability to justify per-
sonal political stewardship. The current crisis in Ukraine is dangerous 
not simply because of the existing fighting or regional instability, but 
because its settlement will determine the trajectory of the Russian 
economy, the strength of the Russian state, and the resolution of Pu-
tin’s time in office.
 The strategic cause of war in Ukraine is that Ukraine existing out-
side a Russia-led political and economic bloc would include a future of 
Ukraine succeeding in political and economic reforms sufficiently well 
to join a competitor bloc, the European Union. If a Maidan-oriented 
government cannot commit not to joining a rival bloc, and undergo 
painful reforms to do so, then the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 
would find its own abilities to expand quite limited. The demonstra-
tion effect of a country institutionally similar to Russia opening itself 
to political and economic competition would be similarly quite unwel-
come. The war is meant to thwart that scenario and induce Ukraine to 
return to the EEU, so that Russia can build the EEU into a world-class 
bloc and itself a peer competitor to other regional hegemons such as 
Germany and the United States. This is effectively the world order 
negotiated by Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush at the Malta 
Summit in 1989, which brought the Cold War to an end and retained 
the Soviet Union as a leading power in European and international 
security. The Soviet Union’s collapse brought that vision to an end, 
and Putin’s tenure has been marked by efforts to return to a post-Cold 
War world instead of remaining in a 1991 post-Soviet world.
 Putin’s sixteen years as the executive authority of Russia has 
been a success as marked by the traditional metrics of Russian lead-
ers: his tenure is not seriously challenged, the borders have expand-
ed, absolute income and consumption levels are up, and Russia’s 
diplomatic centrality provides international status and prestige that 
justifies relative declines in income and consumption. The country he 
inherited was not in good shape, and Putin has tamed the elite, re-
distributed a serendipitous influx of energy revenues like manna from 
heaven, and successfully expanded Russian interests and forces into 
the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. Yet as economic 
growth has stalled and living standards of the non-elite begin to de-
cline, the familiar challenge of Russian governance has returned: the 
president needs to demonstrate competence by delivering growth or 
by delivering foreign victory. The first requires yet another influx of 
energy revenues, but control of the oil market is beyond any indi-
vidual, or by undoing the statist model, which threatens elite support, 
whether the elite class is called boyare, dvoryanstvo, nomenklatura, 
or siloviki. If that policy path is closed off, then foreign victory suffices, 
but expansion increases risk of great power conflict or exhausting the 
country’s financial and human resources in preparation for the next 
war. To maintain the latter, Putin signed the 2012 May Decrees, which 
ordered spending raises in education, healthcare, utilities, housing, 
and other sectors. Yet those mandates are not funded at the federal 
level, but at the regional level, which has accordingly seen indebted-
ness rise accordingly and rapidly. Half the country’s regions have debt 
more than 50% current revenues and in two of the most indebted 
regions — Astrakhan and Mordovia — debt is over 100%, raising the 
risk that default anywhere could lead to a “run on the bank” ending in 
the Finance Ministry itself losing market access.
 Over the past three years, the questions of Russia’s institutional 
congruity with Ukraine and the exact placement of their mutual border 
have defined revision of the international order. Vladimir Putin and 
his Ukrainian counterpart Petro Poroshenko are each betting that the 
other side will collapse first. Ukraine has the early head start and if it 
collapses first and sues for peace with Russia, the outcome will be 
manageable for international affairs: Ukraine will be poor and neutral 
indefinitely. If Putin is unable to deliver growth or victory, then the out-
come will be dire indeed. 
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 3 8
Y u v a l  W e b e r
Visiting Assistant Professor
Government Department 
Harvard University
USA
Kathryn W. and Shelby Davis Fellow
Davis Center for Russian and  
Eurasian Studies
Harvard University
USA
Assistant Professor
Faculty of World Economy and  
International Affairs
National Research University – 
Higher School of Economics
Moscow, Russia
3 2
B a l t i c  R i m  E c o n o m i e s3 1 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 I S S U E  #  4
www.utu . f i /pe i
A r t u r  U s a n o v
Energy security challenges in 
Kaliningrad
Geopolitics and energy security are often closely inter-twined. Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea Coast, provides a clear example of the heavy costs that geopolitics can impose on energy security.  Kaliningrad’s exclave location means that its energy security is highly 
dependent on the overall relations and the level of trust between Rus-
sia and Lithuania, and the European Union more generally.  These 
relations worsened dramatically in 2014, but they had been steadily 
deteriorating for several years even before that.  
 Kaliningrad is almost totally dependent on the external supplies 
of all types of fuels – natural gas, coal and oil products (although 
Kaliningrad produces some crude oil it is 100% exported). Until 2005 
Kaliningrad also produced less than 10% of electricity it consumed 
with the balance supplied by or through the Lithuanian grid.  Although 
this situation worried Russian policy makers for many years the first 
unit of a large combined heat and power plant in Kaliningrad (known 
as CHPP-2) was brought online only in October 2005, which was fol-
lowed by the second one in December 2010.  It made Kaliningrad 
self-sufficient in electricity generation, and since 2011 Kaliningrad has 
been able to export excess electricity to Lithuania.  
 It is able to do so because currently the electric grids in Belarus, 
Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania operate at the synchronized 
frequency via the BRELL agreement making them one wide area 
synchronous grid (the BRELL ring). Large synchronous grids help to 
reduce electricity demand variability, to share reserve capacity and 
to facilitate cross-border electricity trading.  Kaliningrad, being part 
of the BRELL ring, can balance its power system by selling excess 
electricity to Lithuania or by receiving electricity from the BRELL ring 
when it experiences shortages.
 However, all three Baltic countries intend to exit the BRELL ring 
and to switch to the synchronous grid of Continental Europe by 2020 
(the Lithuania’s parliament adopted a bill to this end in 2012).  This 
step is justified almost exclusively by geopolitical reasons since “no 
traditional technical or economic argument” has been found for the 
change of the grid according to the study conducted by a Swedish 
consulting company Gothia Power AB for the grid operators in the 
Baltic States. 
 Withdrawing of Lithuania from the BRELL ring will make Kalin-
ingrad an energy island.  Cross-border flows of electricity between 
Kaliningrad and Lithuania using existing transmission lines will be-
come impossible. This immediately raises the issue of the security of 
electricity supply in Kaliningrad. Although Kaliningrad currently gener-
ates more electricity than it consumes, it is overwhelmingly depend-
ent on a single power source, CHPP-2, which accounts for 95% of the 
installed dispatchable capacity.  The danger of such dependence was 
illustrated by a blackout in August of 2013, when the automatic pro-
tection system at the CHPP-2 shut it down after high-voltage power 
lines were hit by lightning.  The blackout affected most of region’s 
population and the supply of electricity was restored only with the help 
of power flows from Lithuania.  In order to avoid a situation like this 
one of the main electricity reliability standards says that the system 
should be able to withstand the loss of its largest component (N-1). 
This implies that Kaliningrad needs the additional generation capacity 
similar to that of the CHPP-2 – 875 MW.  
 To address this problem the Russian government has devised a 
plan that involves Rosneftegaz, a state holding company that owns 
shares in Rosneft and Gazprom, investing in four new power plants in 
the Kaliningrad province with the total installed capacity of around 940 
MW. Three of them will be gas-fired and one - coal-fired. Construction 
of the first plants started in summer of 2016. All four power plants are 
planned to be finished by 2019. The costs of new power plants and 
required expansion of the electric grid will be more than 70 billion 
roubles (approximately €1 billion) according to Inter RAO UES.  Ulti-
mately, these costs will be borne by electricity consumers in Russia 
via higher prices and tariffs. 
 A cheaper option for Kaliningrad to ensure the reliability of its 
electricity system would be to integrate into the synchronized power 
system of Continental Europe together with the Baltic States.  Unsur-
prisingly, this option was rejected given the lack of trust in the recent 
EU-Russia relations.  
 The expansion of the installed generation capacity in the region 
creates the problem of additional fuel supply, in particular, of natural 
gas.  Currently, all natural gas consumed in Kaliningrad is supplied 
by the pipeline Minsk-Vilnius-Kaliningrad, crossing Belarus and Lithu-
ania. Its capacity was already expanded in 2009 to ensure that the 
CHPP-2 has enough natural gas. Increasing the capacity of this pipe-
line once more would be the most obvious and least expensive option 
to expand the supply of natural gas supply to the province. Histori-
cally, Lithuania has been a reliable transit country for the natural gas 
supplies to Kaliningrad. But again geopolitics trumps economics: in 
the current reality a 100% dependence on the natural gas transit via 
Lithuania is no longer considered acceptable by Russian policymak-
ers.
 One option avoiding the dependence on Lithuania was adding a 
branch to the Nord Stream pipeline that would allow Kaliningrad to 
receive natural gas directly from this pipeline. It did not gain traction, 
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however, and the current plan envisions the construction of a LNG 
regasification terminal in Kaliningrad.  In April 2015 South Korea’s 
Hyundai Heavy Industries has won a US$ 295 million Gazprom’s ten-
der to build a FSRU (floating storage and regasification unit) that will 
serve as the Kaliningrad LNG terminal. Interestingly, it is the same 
company that built a FSRU for Klaipeda, Lithuania.  The terminal will 
be connected by a pipeline to the gas distribution network and the 
underground gas storage facility. 
 Despite the collapse of international LNG prices in 2014-2016 
they are still much higher than the wholesale gas tariff in Kaliningrad. 
This implies that either Gazprom or the Russian government will have 
to subsidize operations of the LNG terminal. This led some analysts 
to suggest that the FSRU is likely to be used mainly either as a con-
ventional LNG tanker or for LNG bunkering but at the same time it will 
be able provide an insurance against possible supply interruptions. 
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 This discussion shows how geopolitics can trump economic ben-
efits of trade and integration, and imposes very large deadweight 
costs on the energy sector both in Kaliningrad and Lithuania: e.g. 
Kaliningrad has to double its generation capacity while it already pro-
duces more electricity than it consumes.  Eventually, Kaliningrad will 
become a well-protected energy fortress but at great expense.   
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Debates in Russia on closing of 
underperformed Special Economic 
ones
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which have never been used by SEZes. Another tool for reforms was 
directed on increasing the role of regional shareholders, i.e. regional 
authorities in management of SEZes on their territory. The idea was 
to convert SEZes from branches of the JSC SEZ into subsidiary units, 
registered in Russian regions and run by their authorities.
 Another wave of criticism on SEZes came in November 2015 from 
leaders o the All-Russian People Front, a coalition of pro-Governmen-
tal movements and non-governmental organization, which typically 
vocalize dissatisfaction of Kremlin towards authorities in Federal Gov-
ernment and regions. All-Russian People Front questioned the very 
idea of SEZes as symbols of inefficiency of public institutions in Rus-
sia.
Prospects for changes in the near future
Current economic crisis (since spring 2015) and economic sanctions, 
imposed on Russia (since spring 2014) should be mentioned as main 
reasons for change in Russian Government’s strategy towards SEZ-
es. Rigid monetary policy of Russia’s Central Bank and attempts to 
put inflation under control made budget cuts unavoidable. SEZes as 
a project from ‘Golden Era” of high oil prices (2005-2013) has become 
one of the first victims of new Governmental policy. 
 The Federal Government of Russia is planning to publish in au-
tumn 2016 a Report, which evaluate current state of affairs regard-
ing SEZes in Russia and to suggest policy measures to reshape the 
project. Neither federal budget of Russia, nor budgets of ‘subject of 
Federation”, i.e. Russian regions, are not able today to handle this 
ineffective project, which lacks strategic vision and clear results after 
10 years of its implementation. The most likely candidates for clo-
sure in the very near future are port logistics SEZes in Murmansk and 
Khabarovsk Kray, as well as tourist SEZes in the North-Caucasus 
Federal District, as well as in Siberian and Far Eastern Federal Dis-
tricts. Other SEZes follow them later.
Conclusion: Reasons of crisis for SEZs in Russia
Russian authorities will continue their search for appropriate organi-
zational and institutional model for modernization of the country. How-
ever, it is almost impossible for them to get any long-lasting positive 
results from such efforts without lifting Western sanctions on financial 
and high-tech sectors of national economy, further reforms of state 
corporations, establishment competitive institutions in domestic econ-
omy and demonopolization of its leading economic sectors. Other-
wise, all SEZes will become imminent victims of the budget cuts in 
Russia in 2017-2019.   
Special Economic Zones – history of institution in RussiaSpecial economic zones (SEZ) play remarkable role in im-plementation of Russian Government’s vision on how na-tional economy should be reformed and modernized. This 
institution was inaugurated in Russian Federation in 2005 as a tool for 
speeding-up socio-economic development of rather limited territories 
inside Russian regions. Wide range of strategic tasks to be solved by 
Russian SEZs includes facilitation of growth of foreign trade, general 
economic development, and social, regional as well as scientific-and-
technological development.  Each SEZ has received special legal 
status, protected for 49 years. Since 2006 the Joint Stock Company 
‘Special Economic Zones’ has become the operator of all the existing 
and developed special economic zones in Russia. Their specializa-
tions are in industrial production, technological innovation, tourism 
and recreation, and port logistics and transport hubs.
 Government of Russian Federation provided several important 
incentives for investors. 1) free access to infrastructure for business, 
which had to be constructed by budget funds, operated by the Federal 
Government; 2) status of free customs zone for each SEZ; 3) a wide 
range of tax exemptions depending on type of a zone.
 In 2005-2015 Russian Government channeled about RUR 186 
billion for the SEZ project, but RUR 24 billion have never been spent 
by them. It costs RUR 10 million for the Federal Budget of Russia to 
create one ‘working position’, i.e. job, in a SEZ. This is equivalent of 
average salary for 25 years of employment in Russian Federation 
today!
Pretensions to Russian SEZ from the Government and 
Society
Skepticism on the efficiency of the ‘SEZ model’ for modernization 
of Russian economy and utilization of Russian federal funds let the 
Chamber of Audit of Russian Federation as well as the Office of the 
Prosecutor General of Russian Federation  to start investigation of 
activities of SEZes in 2011. We may sum up results of the investiga-
tion by following: the whole project of SEZes faces serious structural 
and institutional problems. They include slow construction of infra-
structure for SEZes by regional authorities, bureaucratic inefficiency, 
red-tape, lack of Russian managers with practical skills to run the 
project. The most problematic sector is nowadays the tourist and rec-
reational SEZes. These zones are located mostly in areas with very 
poor transport infrastructure and are hardly accessible for both busi-
nesses to invest and tourists to travel: Irkutsk region, the Republic of 
Buryatia, Russky Island near Vladivostok, resorts of Northern Cauca-
sus. Construction and development in such areas restricted by many 
environmental and bureaucratic regulations as well. 
 In August 2012, newly re-elected President Vladimir Putin has in-
structed Federal Government of Russia to evaluate efficiency of the 
project and money spent for its implementation. New eligibility crite-
ria for evaluation of them was announced: efficiency of spending of 
public funds for construction of infrastructure; the volume of funds, 
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Putin’s propaganda machine
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The last years the West has been confronted with an in-creasingly aggressive Russian propaganda offensive, which – and that is new – is extremely successful. This of-fensive started during Putin’s second presidency. In May 2005 the Kremlin launched Russia Today, a cable TV which 
had the task to become a global competitor of CNN, BBC World, and 
Deutsche Welle. The channel went live on December 10, 2005. The 
Kremlin, prepared to invest large sums in the project, reserved a 
budget of $70 million in the first year. This budget went up to $80 mil-
lion in 2007, $120 million in 2008, and was tripled in 2011 to $380 mil-
lion. The organization grew at a fast pace, with a staff of two thousand 
employees worldwide, reporting from twenty bureaus. It had a bureau 
in Washington with about one hundred personnel. The new Russian 
cable TV was very successful. In 2013 two million Britons watched RT 
regularly. It offered programs in English, Arabic, and Spanish. After 
the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of eastern 
Ukraine, the Kremlin decided to start also a French-language and 
German-language channel. RT’s success is undeniable. It has be-
come a full-fledged propaganda tool of the Kremlin and has acquired 
free access to Western audiences without being bothered too much 
by media regulations, such as impartiality rules. This success led the 
Kremlin to revamp also The Voice of Russia, its international radio 
station. By decree of 9 December, 2013, it merged with the news 
agency RIA Novosti and became part of a new organization, called 
Rossiya Segodnya (which, in Russian, also means Russia Today). 
The new international radio station was rebaptized into Radio Sputnik 
and became part of a broader platform, Sputnik News, which has also 
an online presence. The new radio station began to broadcast on 10 
November 2014.
 The Russian propaganda offensive was not restricted to radio 
and TV. Already in 2007 the Kremlin had started another project, 
called Russia Beyond The Headlines. This project was initiated by the 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which is the official Kremlin paper. Also this pro-
ject was very ambitious. Once a month, an eight-page supplement is 
added to a group of highly influential Western papers. These included 
the Washington Post (United States), the New York Times (United 
States), the Daily Telegraph (United Kingdom), Le Figaro (France), 
Repubblica (Italy), El País (Spain), De Standaard (Belgium), and the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany).  The title of this paid supplement is 
Russia Now in the United States and the UK, La Russie d’Aujourd’hui 
in France, Russland Heute in Germany. The supplements have their 
own websites. The supplements have an attractive layout and they 
offer a mix of sport, culture, tourism, art, and faits divers. The sup-
plements resemble Western newspapers. One does not find straight-
forward Kremlin propaganda in it. On the contrary, one can read 
sometimes open criticism of the Kremlin leaders. In one such a sup-
plement, for instance, one could read an interview with the regime 
critic Lyudmila Ulitskaya, a Russian writer, who talks about her cor-
respondence with the jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, praising 
him as “brilliant.”  These “critical” articles would never stand a chance 
of being published in the mother paper of these supplements, the 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 
 Also the Internet became a battlefield for the Kremlin’s propagan-
da war. A new phenomenon became the so-called “Kremlin trolls.” 
These trolls sell the Kremlin’s policies to the internet community by 
writing blogs, attacking opposition websites, and posting comments 
on Facebook and Twitter. In times of increased tension with the West 
these activities reached new heights. In May 2014, for instance, dur-
ing the invasion of Ukraine, the British paper The Guardian received 
a massive number of pro-Russian comments, often written in a poor 
English. In June 2015 more information became available on the se-
cret activities of these Russian “troll farms” when Lyudmila Savchuk, 
a former employee, sued her employer, a company based in Saint 
Petersburg, called “Internet Research,” which would have failed to 
provide her a contract. This firm employed an estimated workforce 
of four hundred employees, who worked in two twelve-hour shifts. 
They were paid relative high salaries of about $780 a month for post-
ing comments on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. Each 
employee would be in charge of a dozen or more fake Facebook and 
Twitter accounts. 
 Another innovation, used by the Kremlin to spread its message 
in the West was hiring Western communication firms. This was new. 
In the time of the Cold War this would have been impossible. But 
after the demise of the Soviet Union and Russia’s re-integration in 
the capitalist world economy it became possible for the Kremlin to 
get access to prestigious Western lobbying and communication firms. 
These firms, from their side, were eager to work with the Kremlin. In 
2006, when Russia was tasked to organize the G8 summit in Saint 
Petersburg, the Kremlin hired the prestigious New York-based firm 
Ketchum with its Brussels-based daughter GPlus Europe. The $2 mil-
lion contract included sending twenty-five people to Saint Petersburg, 
who established podcasts featuring Russian officials, and made a 
webcast of the summit with the BBC. The Kremlin was satisfied, be-
cause its reputation had received a boost. In January 2007 it signed a 
two-month contract for $845,000 with Ketchum and its subsidiary, the 
Washington Group. The contract was worth its money. Ketchum lob-
bied successfully on behalf of Putin, who was elected in 2007 as Time 
Magazine’s “Person of the Year.” However, the political implications of 
the Kremlin’s cooperation with Ketchum became more clear during 
the war in Georgia in 2008, when Ketchum was helpful in setting up a 
web platform, called ModernRussia, later changed into ThinkRussia, 
which disseminated the official Kremlin views. Even the annexation 
of the Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent invasion of eastern 
Ukraine did not end the cooperation between the Kremlin and the 
American PR firm.  
Marcel H. Van Herpen is the author of “Putin’s Propaganda Machine – Soft Power 
and Russian Foreign Policy,” (Lanham MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) and “Putin’s 
Wars – The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism,” (Lanham MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2014). 
The author’s website is www.marcelhvanherpen.com  
M a r c e l  H .  V a n  H e r p e n
M a r c e l  H .  V a n  H e r p e n 
Director
The Cicero Foundation
The Netherlands
3 6
B a l t i c  R i m  E c o n o m i e s3 1 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 I S S U E  #  4
www.utu . f i /pe i
The Arctic Route: a Russian ploy?
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In the fall of 2015, 5.500 asylum seekers travelling the so-called Arctic route were admitted to Norway at the border crossing point near Kirkenes. What caused this flow of migrants? Why did the Russian border authorities allow transits? Why did they all come to Norway and not to Finland?
 Some Norwegian observers theorized that Russian authorities 
had manipulated migrants, and actively directed them towards the 
border. Allegedly, Norway was the victim of Russian hybrid warfare, 
designed to destabilize the country. But could there be other more 
plausible explanations? 
 The assumption in Norway, and probably also among prospective 
migrants, was that the border area was subject to a strict Russian 
control regime that would prevent most individuals not carrying a Nor-
wegian visa from reaching the border. This was not an unreasonable 
assumption. It was, however, not sensitive to certain nuances. The 
border regime in Murmansk had gradually been liberalized, notably in 
2012. Not only Russians, but also foreign citizens are free to transit 
through and to reside in the area, provided they are in possession of 
relevant permits for their stay in Russia. The Russian border guard 
(FSB) may control, but not detain travelers with valid documents.
 Thus, despite liberalization, migratory traffic was minimal. That 
changed in the summer of 2015, when “the Arctic Route” was tested. 
To people wanting to flee Middle Eastern countries, it turned out it was 
both less risky and cheaper than alternative routes. And travelling into 
Russia, as tourists or for other purpose, was not a big problem. Once 
it became clear that the route to the border of a presumed refugee-
friendly country was open, news spread quickly.   
 Already in August 2012 the regional FSB, in an attempt to com-
pensate for its diminished powers, requested Norwegian border au-
thorities to issue a restrictive statement to third-country citizens not 
holding a Norwegian visa. As the Russians saw it, this would give 
their border guards legal grounds for stopping migrants without a visa 
before they reached the border. Norwegian authorities declined. This, 
however, changed in late 2015, amidst increasing migratory pressure. 
On 25 November, Russian border guards were finally equipped with 
a letter from the Norwegian side that stated that travelers without visa 
to Norway would not be admitted across the border.
 In other words, the Russian border regime remained unchanged 
after 2012. The change that did occur was the result of evolving Nor-
wegian policies in late 2015.
 It is widely known that a number of Russian officials in various 
ways exploited refugees for profit. Corrupt practices are, however, 
hardly evidence that Russian authorities orchestrated the flow of 
asylum seekers. When the migrants had arrived in the north-west, 
Russian border authorities were set on removing them as quickly as 
possible. But – the fact that they ushered them out does not imply 
that they initially welcomed them in – quite the contrary. Large groups 
of migrants in a sensitive border area must obviously be a problem 
for the security service. But why, then, were such a large number of 
migrants admitted to the border area in the first place? 
 In our opinion, Russian bureaucratic practices provide much of 
the answer. Russian officials are slavishly bound to rules and regula-
tions, and the liberalized border regime was meticulously observed by 
the FSB. Moscow became seriously involved only in October, when 
the Norwegian Minister of foreign affairs raised the migration issue in 
talks with his Russian counterpart. The fact that Russia still remained 
passive has been construed as a willed punishment of Norway. We 
think it is more likely that the Russian side felt that Norway was in a 
better position to solve the problem, in accordance with FSB’s long-
standing request to Norwegian border authorities. Pushing Norway to 
act on FSBs requests would also provide a small foreign policy prize 
for Russia.
 What about Finland? Only after the Norwegian-Russian border in 
practice was sealed off in late November did the refugees approach 
the two border crossing points in Finnish Lapland. Also in Finland, 
there existed a general, but flawed assumption that the Russian bor-
der guards would detain migrants before they reached Raja-Jooseppi 
and Salla. And – like in Norway – Finnish authorities eventually en-
gaged in talks with the Russian side to halt the flow of asylum seek-
ers. The result was an agreement that temporarily stopped further 
migratory pressure.
 Why did the migrants not try to use the larger border crossings 
further south in Finland? We can only hypothesize. It may be that from 
the outset Norway was regarded as more attractive, or liberal than 
Finland. When Norway closed its border many refugees were already 
in the region, turning their attention to the nearest Finnish border 
crossing points, thus creating a new route. Migration experts maintain 
that established routes will be followed, as long as they work.  
 As we see, both proofs of the “hybrid warfare-theory” – that the 
Russian border regime had changed to accommodate migrants and 
that the NATO-member Norway was “punished”, while Finland was 
not – are false assumptions.
 The factor that most plausibly explains the sudden increase in 
asylum seekers at the northern border crossings is neither conspir-
atorial nor particularly exciting, but far more logical: Migrants from 
various countries became aware of a route to the Schengen area that 
was less expensive and exceedingly less risky than the established 
alternative further south in Europe.   
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Inequality and the broken social 
contract in Russia
Economic inequality in Russia is growing. The level is com-parable to that of the United States (Russia’s officially reported Gini coefficient is lower than America’s, but the 90:10 ratio--ie the ratio of the 90th income percentile to the 10th--is higher). It rises with income growth.  When real 
wages and incomes fall, so does inequality, but when they start rising 
again, income gains accrue first and most to those at the top.  Rus-
sian inequality is partly a function of the country’s dependence on 
natural resources (oil and gas generate half the government revenues 
and two thirds of the country’s exports), which helps explain the very 
wide income differentials across regions.  But Russian inequality also 
shows many of the same features observed in the United States, such 
as the capitalization of rents in the financial industry.  The steady rise 
of average wages in Russia’s financial industry has kept pace with 
those in the oil and gas extraction sector.  Until very recently wage 
growth in the state administration also outpaced that in most other 
sectors of the economy.
 Russia shares with the United States the “Hollywood” effect of 
granting outsized compensation packages to top-level managers.  If 
the ratio of CEO pay to that of average workers in the US is now about 
300, the ratio of CEO pay to the average pay in the Russian economy 
is about 500.  Russian CEO’s of comparably-sized companies make 
more than their American and British counterparts. Thus the con-
centration of income gains among the top 1% in Russia resembles 
equivalent trends in the West.
 Moreover, the Credit Suisse World Wealth Report finds that in-
equality in the distribution of wealth in Russia is the highest in the 
world.  The top 1% of wealth holders own over 70% of all wealth 
(almost double the share in the US).  
 Inequality begets inequality as advantage cumulates across gen-
erations and regions.  High inequality in a society corrodes the sense 
of shared risk and shared opportunity and undermines the commit-
ment to common purpose.  Public goods become bifurcated between 
low-quality services for the poor, and high-quality privatized services 
for the rich.   Increasingly, the well-off live in a world that is physically 
and emotionally remote from the world experienced by those in the 
middle and lower income brackets.  
 Like the US and China, Russia stands out among peer countries 
in its level of inequality: inequality in the US is highest among the ad-
vanced industrial democracies; Russia’s among the post-communist 
world; and China in East Asia. What accounts for the similarity?  Al-
though there are reasons particular to each country, there are also 
some common factors.  Among these are the weakness of organized 
labor as a counterweight to business, the large population of migrant 
labor often working outside the formal sector, and the intertwining of 
wealth and power that allows the wealthy to raise the value of rent-
generating assets. 
 The old socialist social contract in the USSR provided social guar-
antees--employment, education, health care, recreation, pensions 
and so on--in return for political quiescence.  That social contract has 
almost completely broken down but it has not been replaced by some-
thing else. The Russian government’s refusal to consider moving from 
the flat 13% income tax to a progressive income tax scale is illustra-
tive of how deep the resistance is to adopting a redistributive system 
of taxation, social spending, and social insurance.  Russian taxes and 
social programs have hardly any redistributive effect: much as in the 
US, wage inequality is translated almost fully into income inequality.  
     Russia’s political institutions do not permit the contestation and 
bargaining over the distribution of social risk and reward that shape 
policy in a democratic system of corporatism or partisan elections. 
Rather, disputes over marginal adjustments to tax rates and social 
insurance programs are confined to the federal bureaucracy, where a 
liberal wing from the Finance and Economic Ministries wrestles with 
a bloc of social ministries (Ministry of Labor, Pension Fund).  Russia’s 
tax and social policies are the outcome of compromises among these 
blocs and often veer back and forth as one or the other bloc is ascend-
ant.  However, Russia’s stagnant and resource-cursed economy does 
not yield sustained economic growth that would drive down inequal-
ity through broadly shared prosperity, nor a fully redistributive social 
market economy. A reform of political and legal institutions that decou-
pled growth from inequality could encourage both entrepreneurship 
and a progressive social policy.  So far, however, the regime has not 
seriously pursued such institutional reform. 
T h o m a s  F .  R e m i n g t o n
Goodrich C. White Professor of Political Science
Emory University
Atlanta, GA, USA
3 8
B a l t i c  R i m  E c o n o m i e s3 1 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 I S S U E  #  4
www.utu . f i /pe i
A n n a  L u k i y a n o v a
Reforming the minimum wage in 
Russia
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 4 4
 These changes reduced the risks of minimum wage increases 
and triggered a number of large increases. The real national minimum 
wage more than doubled over the period of less than 2 years after the 
start of the reform. In 2009, the national minimum wage jumped to the 
level of 25% of the average wage. In the low-wage regions, it rocketed 
to 40%–50% of the average wage, which was a shock change in the 
regulatory environment. However, the rise in the share of minimum 
wage earners was small and short-lived even in the depressed re-
gions. By 2016, the ratio of minimum to average wage declined to 
15-17%.
 Many regions took the opportunity to introduce their own wage 
minima. By mid-2015, regional minima existed in 62 out of 83 Russian 
regions (another 9 regions set minimum wages at least once between 
2007 and 2015), but the coverage was limited to the private sector in 
half of all regions that introduced the regional minima. Additionally, 
about 15% of regional agreements cover the public sector but still set 
higher rates for the private sector. Thus, the generosity of regional 
minima is largely populist as majority of low-paid employees work in 
municipal establishments.
 The reform generally succeeded in improving the linkage of mini-
mum wages with regional costs of living. Minimum wage increases 
led to substantial compression of the earnings distribution. The evalu-
ation of institutional changes is more problematic. The system of mini-
mum wage setting has become more flexible. The reform contributed 
to strengthening of social partnership at the regional level. However, 
peak trade union organizations have little confidence in collective bar-
gaining in the regions and continue to campaign for further substan-
tial increases in the national rate. Co-existence of different minimum 
wages reduces regulatory transparency and complicates enforce-
ment. The major challenge in coming years is to introduce evidence-
based evaluation and boost the capacities of government and trade 
union monitoring agencies.     
The minimum wage already existed during the Soviet times in the form of the lowest grade of the Unified wage grid, though it was not called the minimum wage at that time. The term “minimum wage” appeared in national legislation after the start of market reforms in the early 1990s. De-
spite the amendments in terminology, the minimum wage setting re-
gime remained largely unchanged and inherited many features from 
the central planning era. The country had a single national minimum 
wage. The use of “regional” coefficients for areas with adverse cli-
mate conditions provided a certain degree of regional differentiation. 
The system was rigid because regional authorities had no influence 
on the value of the national rate and on the size of the coefficients. 
The minimum wage was applied universally to all workers regardless 
of age, occupation, industry, ownership, and firm size.
 The government tended to change the national minimum wage ir-
regularly, with changes depending largely on political reasons. Hyper-
inflation in the 1990s caused a dramatic erosion of the real minimum 
wage in Russia. As a result, in 2000 the minimum wage amounted to 
4% of the average wage. Though a number of increases were intro-
duced between 2000 and 2006, they maintained the ratio at about 
10%.
 Sharp decline of the real minimum wage was an unintended con-
sequence of the link between minimum wages and social benefits. 
Additionally, majority of low-paid workers were concentrated in the 
Russian public sector. For a long time the minimum wage was tied to 
the lowest grade of the Unified wage grid and any upgrading in the 
minimum wage generated – via the wage grid coefficients – an gave 
rise to spillover effects on the entire wage distribution. Thus, the link-
age of the minimum wage with social benefits and the wage-setting 
arrangements in the public sector increased the budgetary costs of 
the minimum wage increases.
 In 2007, the Russian government initiated a reform of the mini-
mum wage setting. The reform aimed to increase living standards 
and shift the financial burden of raising minimum wages to regional 
budgets. High oil prices and budget surpluses made it possible to 
increase the remuneration of the public sector workers. Upgradings of 
the minimum wage were eased by the reforms of social security and 
wage setting in the public sector. The government delinked the mini-
mum wage setting from the social security and tax systems in 2000. 
The Unified wage grid was cancelled in 2008. The reform abandoned 
the use of regional coefficients in calculating the minimum wage. In-
stead, regions were given power to set minimum wages in excess of 
the national rate through regional tripartite agreements. Institutionally, 
the existing system is a mixture of the government-set minimum wage 
at the federal level and collective agreements at the regional level.
A n n a  L u k i y a n o v a
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Fighting inequality: back to Policy 
Agenda in Russia
I r i n a  D e n i s o v a
The recently observed recession in Russia’s economy has also been accompanied by a decline in real incomes for large groups of the country’s population. Combined, they pose a threat, hypothetically so far, to social stability and long-term sustainability. As a consequence, the issue of 
inequality, including regional inequality, has been placed on the top 
of economic and political agendas. The recession, however, has nar-
rowed the resource base for redistribution, thereby making this issue 
more challenging, and the search for solutions extremely difficult to 
say the least. 
 Inequality in Russia has remained high throughout the transition 
period, and even slightly increased in the 2000s; the Gini inequality 
index rose from 0.397 in 2001 to 0.416 in 2014. The ratio of the aver-
age incomes of the highest decile to those of the lowest decile also in-
creased from 13.9 to 16 during this same period. This  income gap is 
generated primarily  from the gap between incomes of the top decile 
and all of the others: the top decile is estimated to get thirty percent of 
the total monetary income in the economy. Further, income inequality 
originates in earnings inequality: the top decile of wage earners gets 
thirty five percent of total wage earnings in the economy.
 What is even more worrisome, there is a large share of wage 
earners with wages below subsistence level, thus boosting inequal-
ity measures further in addition to providing a significant indicator of 
hardship for those left behind during the past 15 years of so called 
economic progress. The estimate for 2015 is about 3mn people; or 
11% of wage earners. This is a pronounced decline from more than 
twenty four percent in 2005, but is still very high. The existence of so 
many low-paid jobs is a part of the explanation of the large share of 
working poor in Russia and a rationale for attempts to reform the labor 
market in order to eliminate these jobs. The attempts so far have not 
been very successful as the key reforms, competition policy reforms, 
are falling far behind due for political economy reasons. In the public 
sector there is an attempt to increase the wages of education and 
healthcare professionals by demanding (via the May 2012 Presiden-
tial Decree) that the wages of this group are not less than the average 
wage in a given region. The Decree stimulated additional expendi-
tures from regional budgets thus causing extra burdens in the period 
of the budgets’ deficits rather than a reform of the public sector. The 
public sector is in need of structural reforms with the main problems 
being its being oversized and inefficient due to a strong negative se-
lection of talents.   
 On top of this, there is a sizeable interregional variation in in-
comes summarized by huge variations in per capita gross regional 
products, in growth rates, in levels of wages and in unemployment 
rates. Yamalo-Nenetsky okrug, the main oil extracting region, has 
GRP per capita six times higher than national average and twenty 
six times higher than the poorest region of Ingushetia Republic, for 
example. 
 Inequality and poverty rates also vary significantly across regions: 
the Gini coefficient is 0.48 in Moscow, 0.44 in St. Petersburg, Tyumen 
and Samara, and 0.36 in Tver and Kostroma regions (the national 
average is 0.42). There is some indication that regions that are expe-
riencing more rapid economic development are among the leaders in 
income inequality, while economically less advanced regions have a 
more equal income distribution.
 Poverty rates (with respect to absolute poverty thresholds differ-
entiated by regions) are even more diverse than inequality measures. 
Kalmikia Republic and Tyva Republic are the leaders in poverty, with 
rates of 35.4% and 33.4%, respectively. Another 56 regions have pov-
erty rates in excess of the national average, which was 10.8% in 2013 
(Murmansk is at the national average). The lowest poverty rates are 
in Yamal (6.6%) and Tatarstan (7.2%), while in Moscow it is 8.9% and 
is 8% in St. Petersburg.
 Interregional inequality recently attracted the attention of top pol-
icy makers who called upon higher equalizing transfers from the rich 
regions to the poor. The suggested mechanism for achieving a more 
favorable balance is a temporary increase in the federal share of profit 
taxes (from 2% to 3% out of 20% rate) to finance increased federal 
interregional transfers. A significant portion of the transfers from the 
federal budget would be used to finance the increase in wages of 
public sector employees required by the Presidential Decree. 
 Ironically, while there is very limited information on the decision-
making process by Russia’s top policy shapers, they seem to be sen-
sitive to the public demands. Indeed, though high inequality is viewed 
by economists as an important incentive for an individual’s effort, the 
public may not be in complete agreement with this view. As measured 
by the EBRD and WB Life in Transition Survey of 2010, which asked 
respondents to indicate whether they prefer more income inequality 
or less and to score their answers from 1 to 10, Russians on aver-
age are close to Germans in their preferences for redistribution (both 
score 6.9 on average), while, for example, Estonians and Belarusians 
prefer less redistribution and are closer to the British (they score 5.9 
on average). It seems that public attitudes toward inequality and the 
demand for redistribution play an import role in shaping social policy 
everywhere, including Russia. 
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Finland offers business opportunities 
for Russian companies
K a r e n  G r i g o r y a n
I .n the changing business environment, attracting direct invest-ments from Russia into Finland requires more time and clear fo-cus.
New economic realities change investment patterns in Russia
The past years of global political and economic turbulence have 
greatly changed the foreign direct investment (FDI) landscape for 
Russia. New local legislation, coupled with new political and financial 
realities, have had effect on the dynamics of Russian investment into 
Finland as well.  
 Traditionally, Russian companies invested primarily in neighbor-
ing countries of the former CIS or in established large European mar-
kets like the Nordics.  
 This pattern has been driven by a common business culture and 
the relatively fewer financial and economic barriers to entry within the 
former CIS region for Russian investors. Outbound FDI flows have 
been dominated by natural resources and basic materials companies, 
unsurprisingly in light of their dominance in the Russian economy.  
 However, current global politics and domestic economics have 
created an atmosphere that has made Russian companies and in-
vestors to reconsider investment outside of Russia. Their plans are 
changing in reaction to the devaluation of the ruble, the increased 
cost of debt capital in Russia, and limited access to international fi-
nance.
 Import substitution programs in Russia have also stimulated new 
plans for Russian companies.
 Practical examples of the impact of these legislative changes and 
import substitution programs include healthcare sector. State owned 
hospitals are required to buy domestically produced pharma prod-
ucts and medical devices. Foreign imports are allowed only if such a 
product is not available from domestic suppliers. As a result, Russian 
pharmaceutical factories are focused on supplying the domestic mar-
ket. 
 Heavy machinery companies are bound by the same procure-
ment rules as pharma companies. Therefore, international expansion 
is not a priority at present neither for pharma nor machinery compa-
nies.
 Also the changes in Russian data protection legislation have had 
an influence on expansion strategies.  Transfer of personal data of 
Russian citizens out of Russia is now prohibited. This naturally elimi-
nates the attractiveness to locate data centers abroad. Furthermore, 
software procurement for government or state owned organizations 
must prioritize domestic software companies. 
Innovation creates bridges between East and West
Despite these complications and a more extended decision process, 
the good news is that Russian companies still view the EU market as 
a long-term strategic priority.  They are open to discuss the possibili-
ties and willing to entertain different options that would allow them to 
advance the EU strategy even within current constrains. 
 Innovative Russian companies with interesting product portfolios 
are looking for new markets and Finnish partners. Slush and Startup-
sauna are great catalysts for Russian startup companies and entre-
preneurs to consider future expansion into Finland. 
 It is clear that the investment decision making for Russian com-
panies will take longer time, and the number of industries and compa-
nies ready to consider such a move will diminish compared to recent 
years. 
 Therefore, the focus should be in attracting mature and innova-
tive Russian companies that are looking to expand their international 
sales together with Finnish partners. Of particular interest are ‘born 
global’ ICT and digital companies that already operate abroad.  These 
companies could take advantage of the talent pool that Finland has to 
offer. 
 Due to the current changes in the Finnish ICT sector, there is now 
a unique opportunity to engage top talents. Nokia’s lasting legacy en-
sures that Finnish engineers know how to mass manufacture even 
the most complex electronics. With access to a Silicon Valley inspired 
business culture, Finland is an R&D hotspot. Innovation driven and 
economically successful Finland has already brought to the world the 
SMS, the Wearable Hearth Rate Monitor, the Linux operative system, 
Clash of Clans, and Angry Birds. 
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Development of e-commerce in 
Russia: from crisis to bright future?
N i k o  H e l l e
The idea of online trade was first conceived in 1979, when an Englishman, Michael Aldrich, connected a modified tel-evision to a real-time transaction processing computer via domestic telephone line. To make his invention available worldwide, Aldrich lacked a number of essential systems 
and functions: infrastructure networks, security, payment systems, 
and a universal human interface to mention a few. These insufficien-
cies were later filled with the invention and proliferation of Internet, 
and today, online shopping has become an increasingly essential 
part of the global economy. According to eMarketer, the global B2C 
e-commerce sales are expected to reach 1.92 trillion U.S. dollars in 
2016.  
 In the couple past decades, Russian online market has seen one 
of the fastest growths on the planet. In 2011, Russia surpassed Ger-
many as the largest European online market in terms of Internet us-
ers. According to W3Techs, Russian language is the second most 
used language in the World Wide Web in 2016. According to vari-
ous estimates, in 2015 Russia was home to 7th largest online market 
globally while the market is estimated to grow annually by high 11.9% 
in 2013–2018.
 Quite naturally, the booming Russian online market has attracted 
a number of foreign e-commerce companies. According to DataIn-
sight, cross-border e-commerce has been the fastest growing seg-
ment of Russian online market. This fact may have been aided by 
Russian legislation: Russian consumers can make purchases up to 
1.000 euro per month per person duty-free in foreign web stores. 
However, evidence shows that a strong local presence – if not full 
market entry – may be required to tap the Russian market’s true po-
tential.  
 Attractiveness of the Russian online market suddenly plummet-
ed as the country entered the ongoing economic and political crisis 
in 2014. Both local and foreign e-commerce companies have seen 
their sales volumes stagnate or decrease as economic downturn and 
inflation have eroded the purchasing power of Russian consumers. 
The Western companies have taken a big hit, as Ruble’s deprecia-
tion has made their prices unattractive to Russian customers. At the 
same time, Chinese online retailers have grown their share of the 
Russian online market dramatically, and today, China is the main driv-
er in cross-border e-commerce in Russia. According to DataInsight, 
the worsening economic conditions favor larger online businesses. 
Large online shops are expected to grow larger with universal selec-
tion, whereas smaller shops are forced to either shut down or change 
format to boutiques shops. Furthermore, a wave of bankruptcies and 
closures is projected to face the middle sized online shops that are 
not merged to larger online shops. 
 Contrary to the downcast ambience, however, Russian online 
market has not lost all of its appeal – perhaps even less so, than 
the current state of business would suggest. Even during the crisis, 
the Russian online market continues to mature and grow. The Inter-
net infrastructure and customs procedures continue to develop, and 
both the Internet penetration rates and online sales figures continue 
to soar. While thus far Moscow and St. Petersburg have been consid-
ered the most lucrative e-commerce markets – in 2013, the two cities 
comprised 60% of Russian online sales – Russia’s other cities are 
developing fast. Furthermore, mobile Internet connections are quickly 
connecting even the furthest Siberian regions to the global online 
market. 
 Russia is often coupled with the idiom ‘sleeping bear’ – the figure 
of speech holds some truth to it in regards to Russian e-commerce 
market as well. Substantial growth is likely to return as soon as the 
crisis ends, and as such, Russia still bears considerable potential for 
foreign e-commerce companies. Making a move towards the market 
during its hibernation can prove to be a winning long-term strategy: at 
this point in time competition is weaker, prices are lower, and due to 
the low value of Ruble, the Russian talent for e-commerce localiza-
tion, web development, and online marketing services are available 
for significantly less than before. 
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Security in the Baltic Sea Region: 
activation of risk potential
K a t r i  P y n n ö n i e m i  &  C h a r l y  S a l o n i u s - P a s t e r n a k
Russian internal and external policies have been consoli-dated around the idea that the West is responsible for the conflict in Ukraine, the current international system is dysfunctional and, what is more, the current constellation of world politics should be changed to better serve Rus-
sia’s national interests. Fundamentally, this reveals a deep yearning 
by Russia to be recognized as a great power that has an important 
role to play in global affairs. Regionally, it means that others should 
acknowledge Russia’s dominant role in the post-Soviet space. Fur-
thermore, both the EU’s influence and NATO’s presence must be kept 
in check, and preferably rolled back. Here, the Baltic Sea Region is 
an important component, if only to ensure that the current strategic 
geography is maintained.
 To analytically approach evolving security situation in the Baltic 
Sea region two features of Russian strategy should be taken into ac-
count: preference for control, be it physical territory or economic and 
information flows; and the ability and will to use the full spectrum of 
tools to prevent and neutralize potential threats to Russia’s vital inter-
ests. When these two features are combined, it appears that Russia 
can effectively cause harm to small states in its neighbourhood. 
 It can be argued that a change in the regional security situation 
has already taken place and this is having direct and indirect impacts 
on Finland and other countries in the region. More broadly, poten-
tial risks to stability in the Baltic Sea Region have been activated, 
although they are not yet, and hopefully never will be, actualized in 
the form of open military conflict. 
 These risks include first, a strategic deception of political elites 
and public opinion in the target country. Russian military analysts have 
long analysed and developed informational-psychological means to 
manage perceptions of reality among the general public and decision-
makers, and thus, to manipulate reactions to ongoing processes. 
 Secondly, Russia has skilfully used strategic resources ranging 
from punitive measures such as trade sanctions and ‘sanitary regula-
tions’ to indirect means of economic pressure, such as political use 
of energy resources, to its advantage. Furthermore, the fundamental 
incongruity between the Russian system and democratic governance 
produces long-term risks for Russian development and short-term op-
portunities that the system insiders may exploit to their advantage. 
 The use of surrogate actors and purposeful misuse of legal and 
institutional instruments is the third risk which has been activated. At 
the most basic level, this involves using a front organization or com-
pany to push for policies or decisions desired by the Kremlin, while 
providing deniability and obscuring the original source of policy ideas 
or even cash.
 Although our focus is on possibility of Russia taking advantage 
of the three aforementioned elements, we should not overlook the 
fact that each of them has its limitations. The consolidation of state 
control over strategic resources provides Russia with considerable 
agility in a conflict situation, but does not insulate the country from the 
fluctuations of world commodity prices. Thus far, the manipulation of 
public opinion has provided a temporary replacement for real political 
and economic reforms, but it cannot compensate for economic growth 
and does not solve the underlying structural problems. Furthermore, 
the disruption of trade relations between the EU member states and 
Russia, as well as increasing awareness among Western politicians 
of Russia’s ‘game-plan’, are factors that in themselves limit the Rus-
sian space for action. 
 To conclude, in the Western view, the Baltic Sea Region is formed 
primarily by the mosaic of institution-based and historically evolved 
relations that shape the respective countries’ self-understanding of 
the region and their role in it. Russia, on the other hand, does not 
see a myriad of intra-regional interdependencies that tie the region’s 
countries together but, rather, an array of strategic deficiencies – not 
least in NATO’s deterrence capabilities – that facilitate its own risk-
taking in a crisis situation. Russia’s demonstrative show of force and 
negligence of commonly agreed-upon rules of engagement signal a 
break with a previous Russian policy that sought to enhance confi-
dence-building between militaries in the Baltic Sea Region. What this 
implies is that should Russia start to cooperate rather than prolong 
the conflict in Ukraine, the means available for confidence-building 
are already in place. 
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T o m i  P a j a r i n e n
The case for increasing defence 
expenditures in the democratic Baltic 
Rim countries
Since World War II, most of the Baltic Sea region has lived in relative stability. Crushing of the Hungarian citizens’ popular upraising against Soviet occupation in 1956 and occupation of Czekhoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet Un-ion, to suppress emerging more liberal thoughts and po-
tential challenge to single party rule, were seen in the mainstream 
Western public opinion in the context of perceived permanence of 
the Iron Curtain. As a result of the economic collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia regained 
their independence in 1991.
 The defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP of many of the 
democratic Baltic Rim states have been practically reduced by half 
from 1998 to 2013. In case of Germany, the percentage change in 
defence expenditures during this time period has been – 52 percent, 
and in case of Sweden, a whopping – 54.2 percent, as a percentage 
of GDP.
 First, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and then, the recent Russian 
occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, have now lead me to 
ask: how much is my political and personal freedom worth to myself ?
 I recalled my frequent visits to the Speakers’ Corner at Hyde Park 
in Central London as a young student. As a standing proof of vitality 
of the British democracy, without state intimidation, these individuals 
at Speakers’ Corner were allowed to express their views most visibly 
in a very prominent location in Central London. In my mind, this was 
in sharp contrast to Russian Interior Ministry troops beating old la-
dies in Moscow, expressing their anger and grief over their lost family 
members or missing relatives in the Russian military venture of the 
Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) of the time.
 The current price of my freedom as a public good, measured by 
defence expenditures per capita in my country of origin, Finland, is 
currently 533 euros annually (2016). This is less than a half of the cost 
of my car insurance per year. However, should I be a citizen of Sin-
gapore, the expenditure on my freedom as a public good, measured 
by defence expenditures per capita, would be 1.732 euros per year 
(2016). The unequivocal political decision made by the Singaporean 
government is that my freedom would be three times more valuable in 
Singapore, if compared to the defence expenditures per capita, than 
my freedom in Finland as a public good.
 These two questions, first, what is my freedom worth, and sec-
ond, what is my fellow citizens’ freedom worth, are two of the most 
fundamental questions that we, as participants in the decision making 
process in a democratic society, should be able to make.
 These two questions may be also be the kind of questions that 
many people do not actively think about. We may perceive the geo-
graphic boundaries of states as static, and our democratic and judicial 
institututions as stable, thus requiring no additional effort on our part 
in guaranteeing their future. Unfortunately, in my opinion, this is a very 
short-sighted view. 
 The demonstrated select intraracial brutality by Homo Sapiens - 
species, under circumstances where democratic state institutions with 
their checks and balances have failed, seem to have no boundaries. 
To make this point, during the dictatorial rule of the recently deceased 
president of Uzbekistan, Mr. Islam Karimov, two opposition journal-
ists, Muzafar Avazov and Khuzniddin Alimov, were reportedly boiled 
alive to death in 2002 by the state security services. Not a funny joke.
 The defence expenditures of selected Baltic Rim Area democratic 
states as share of GDP have declined substantially, between the two 
selected reference years, from 1998 to 2015. Percentage change of 
this decline is shown in Table 1:
TABLE 1
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AS % OF GDP
   1998  2015  ∆ %
Denmark  2.0  1.2  - 40.0
Finland  1.6  1.3  - 18.5
Germany  2.5  1.2  - 52.0
Sweden  2.4  1.1  - 54.2
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks
 Is the current level of defence expenditures by the Baltic Rim Area 
states adequate to guarantee your long-term personal freedoms in a 
politically independent state, in a changed and continuously changing 
European – Eurasian security environment? My short answer is no.
 Clear choices have to be made in government expenditure priori-
ties in the Baltic Rim Area states.
Personally, I would like to see all the democratic Baltic Rim states 
to increase their defence expenditures to meet the set NATO Wales 
2015 Summit goal of two (2) percent of GDP. 
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 Russian government has set its own priorities very clearly: the 
share of military expeditures out of the Russian Federation’s budg-
et have more than doubled since 2009, and may be, in reality, now 
close to 25 percent of the Russian Federation’s budget. This would be 
about five (5) percent of Russian GDP.
 Expenditure on national, and in many cases, also on regional 
defence, does not reduce the GDP in the national accounts. To the 
contrary, investments in R&D intensive defence projects may have a 
higher employment multiplier effect than many other forms of govern-
ment employment.
 As with most issues, things are changed by changing them. I 
have already called my member of the Parliament and will meet him 
next week. And yes, I am willing to pay my car insurance’s worth of 
national defence per year. Just to make sure that I, and my fellow 
citizens, will be welcome to the Speakers’ Corner in the country of my 
residence also in the future.   
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Blue Growth – a facelift or a new 
model to utilize marine resources?
J a r i  H a a p a l a
IntroductionWe, as mankind, need energy, food, jobs and wellbeing. Alongside the others, the marine sector makes an important contribution to the economical growth of Europe. According to the European Un-ion (EU),1 the marine sector provides 5.4 million jobs and gener-
ates a gross added value of €500 billion a year. Locally, in the Baltic 
Sea region, the marine sector provides a living for 900 000 persons.2
 The EU has introduced a “Blue Growth” strategy that is aimed at 
boosting the utilization of marine space and its resources in a sustain-
able manner.  
 The Blue Growth strategy stems from to fact that coastal seas pro-
vide space for large infrastructures, like off-shore wind or fish farms, 
and also that terrestrial resources are becoming depleted. It is self-
evident that we have first utilized the most easily accessible reserves 
of minerals, oil and gas. Consequently, the natural resources of the 
sea floor have mostly remained untouched. However, during the past 
few decades underwater technology has evolved significantly and, in 
addition to oil and gas production, sea floor mining has already com-
menced.
 Healthy fish stocks, the development of aquaculture and tourism 
are also elementary parts of the Blue Growth strategy. 
The SmartSea Project
A new Finnish research project, SmartSea,3 aims to support the 
growth of marine activities in the Gulf of Bothnia region. The Gulf of 
Bothnia is an essential resource – in terms of fish and wind farming for 
example – and it is also possible to make use of the geological natu-
ral resources of the gulf but, most importantly, it is the most pristine 
region of the Baltic Sea.
 Furthermore, the Gulf of Bothnia is an area in which climate 
change impacts on the conditions (from the severity of the ice in win-
ter to the abundance of the fish stock) to a notable extent. The rapid 
growth of commercial marine activities and the consequences of cli-
mate change may lead to conflicts between the different activities and 
harm the marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Bothnia. The project aims 
to identify these risks and find solutions for the sustainable use of the 
sea.
The sustainable use of marine resources 
Blue Growth emphasizes the exploitation of marine resources in a 
sustainable manner. In the past, whaling was a flourishing business 
for oil production but, as we know, it nearly led to the extinction of 
whales. Today, whales are capitalized on in a sustainable manner, as 
an important tourist attraction in many coastal areas. 
 The exploitation and conservation of marine resources are often 
in conflict with each other. The protection of the marine environment 
emphasizes the integrity of the seas and, as on land, human activ-
ity is always changing the natural environment. The key objective of 
1 The Blue Growth strategy of the EU http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/
blue_growth/ 
2 Dahlgren, S., Mrozowksi, T., Källström, N., Seppä, T., Lind, F., Wallin, M., Morin, 
M., 2015. Restoring waters in the Baltic Sea region. A strategy for municipalities and 
local governments to capture economic and environmental benefits. The Boston 
Consulting Group, Inc., p. 50.  
3 The SmartSea project http://smartsea.fmi.fi 
SmartSea is to determine regions where natural values are consider-
ably low and whereindustrial use can be allocated and, on the other 
hand, to detect key regions for the ecosystem, like the reproduction 
areas of fish or the occupance areas of endangered species. 
 One of the global megatrends is the increase in fish farming. In 
Finland, fish consumption is also steadily increasing. However, we 
are dependent on imports of fish despite the broad sea area. Enhanc-
ing fish farming in Finland would create new jobs and could even 
make Finland a country of export fisheries.
 However, an increase in fish farming cannot be made solely on 
economical grounds. Well-known problems of fish farming are the 
leakage of nutrients into the sea, the escape of farmed fishes and the 
threat to indigenous species, as well as the spread of fish diseases. 
Apparently, SmartSea examines new methods and innovations in or-
der to increase fish farming without these risks.
 Another global trend is the construction of wind farms outside the 
coastal zone. Wind farms are becoming giant infrastructures – the 
world’s largest one, a 1.2 GW wind farm, is the equivalent to a nu-
clear power plant and is under construction  off the north-east coast of 
the UK. For comparison, the largest Finnish marine wind farm in Pori 
Tahkoluoto will produce 0.04 GW of energy.
 Sustainable exploitation of the coastal seas requires that all ma-
rine activities are considered simultaneously. For example, the popu-
lation of commercial fish stocks is affected by eutrophication, climate 
change, fishing pressure and changes in spawning areas. All these 
factors must be taken into account when assessing how fish stocks 
are kept strong in the future.
 SmartSea also examines how marine activities could be integrat-
ed. This would significantly reduce the burden on the environment. 
One possibility is to develop a marine oasis, which could be a com-
bined infrastructure for wind power production, fish farming and tour-
ism.
 An anthropogenic influence on the marine environment could be 
catalytic in a positive sense. Marine structures could enhance wild 
fish reproduction. With a good design, structures can be made multi-
form in order that underwater groundworks could provide a reef-like 
environment for marine life.
 A framework aimed at optimizing the use of marine space in a 
sustainable manner will take into account all of these above-men-
tioned demands, natural values and the long-term impacts of human 
activities in a holistic manner and constitute a maritime spatial plan 
covering the entire sea basin. To meet this challenge, SmartSea is 
providing open-access environmental data and an open-source tool-
box to provide a platform upon which to conduct this work. 
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Marine litter challenges stakeholders
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 5 1
In an old Finnish magazine published in the 1930s´ there was a story of an accident which had taken place in a small town. It was about a local resident who decided to move his hut from one place to another. He thought it was convenient to wait until winter and the sea to freeze. Moving a whole small house as one object is 
very challenging, but that happened every now and then. Another op-
tion was to tear down the hut, take the logs, move them and rebuild it 
again. That is how my own great-grandfather had one old big wooden 
house successfully moved long time ago. That went well, there was 
strong ice and strong horses were used to drag the logs. The man in 
the news was unfortunately not that lucky. On the way the ice cover 
started to break and eventually the whole hut sank so that only the 
roof was above water. Luckily nobody drowned, not even horses. Part 
of the hut was recovered, the rest became marine litter. 
 Not that long ago what we now call marine litter (any persistent 
solid material that is manufactured or processed and directly or indi-
rectly, intentionally or unintentionally, disposed of or abandoned into 
the marine environment) consisted mostly of organic and degradable 
material. Like in one of the books of the beloved Finnish writer Tove 
Jansson where the moomins with their friends went out on the beach 
to look for what had been cast ashore after a big storm. They found 
treasures, like a wooden figurehead from a ship. But what would Tove 
Jansson have written today? What kind of treasures the moomins 
would have found on the beach? Whatever items from land or from 
the sea, most likely they would be made of plastics.. 
 Global plastic production has been continuously increasing af-
ter 1950s´. Products made of plastic polymers have been replacing 
other materials because of their cost-effectiveness: plastic products 
are durable, easy to mold, and in general cheap to produce. In the 
year 2014 the world´s plastic production added up to over 300 million 
tons, and is expected to increase further. Modern world is surrounded 
by plastics and very much dependent on these products. In Europe 
applications for packaging include clearly the greatest part of the plas-
tic demand, building and construction being second. Also household 
products and medical applications demand a great deal of the yearly 
plastic production. 
 The amount of marine litter and the global production of plastics 
go hand in hand. Plastic products can escape to the environment dur-
ing their production from raw materials, manufacture process, use 
and waste collecting system. The more plastic items are produced, 
the more will end up in the environment. The issue of plastic waste 
and the problems it is causing in the marine environment is huge. It 
is now regarded as an “emerging issue”, although already 50 years 
ago leisure boaters in Sweden were advised to dump their garbage to 
the sea “the right way” (in a box with some rocks so it would for sure 
sink). Generally it was really OK and common to dump the garbage 
overboard. So this issue now emerging is actually already old and 
worn out. But the management is being planned now. According to 
some estimates only a fragment of the whole litter load is visible to 
human eye on the shore, and most of it is floating somewhere or has 
sunken on the seafloor, or is just so small that it cannot be seen with 
naked eye. Most of that litter we cannot collect anymore and a great 
deal of it is plastic, which is slowly fragmenting into smaller pieces. 
 Degradation takes time even in the case of organic materials, es-
pecially in the cold and dark waters of the Baltic Sea, where degrada-
tion is very slow (about which sea archeologists are very happy). It 
has been said that all the plastic that has been produced in the world 
still exist. Surely also all the plastic that has entered the deep waters 
of the Baltic Sea will continue to exist for an unpredictable very long 
time (hundreds of years or more). 
 In order to develop effective management methods the authorities, 
like local municipalities need as detailed information on the sources 
and pathways –or of how plastic waste turns to marine litter. For this, 
monitoring of litter in various environments should be launched and 
new methods developed, for example for microlitter. The already im-
plemented beach litter surveys have shown that in some cases it is 
easy to see the connection between marine litter and their sources. 
In Finland, as well as in Sweden, Estonia and Latvia, that in a joint 
research project together monitored their beaches for visible litter, the 
connection between packaging and litter items was clear. A great deal 
of all litter was identified to be due the modern take-away life style. 
Whole packages of food and other products, or pieces of them, single 
use cutlery and often mostly unidentified pieces of plastic bags and 
wrappings. Plastic that has just been thrown away. For this kind of 
litter management options probably could include campaigns to in-
crease awareness, additional trash cans, efficient cleaning of popular 
recreational areas, taxes of other fees to reduce the use of plastic 
bags and smart production. 
 On the other hand, allowing the production of cheap single use 
items to continue, we are generating increasing problems globally. 
Another way to deal with a part of this problem is banning. Not dealing 
with the end of the plastic items lifespan, but preventing its birth. For 
example plastic bags have been banned in several countries where 
they cause significant problems. Plastic microbeads that are used in 
personal care products and cosmetics will soon be removed in US 
markets, and quite recently France announced that it will ban plastic 
single use cutlery.
 Maybe in Finland it is possible to manage a part of the intentional 
littering, like the packaging-related litter, if we really commit ourselves 
to that. But what about the input of new “unintentional litter” if the 
sources are not well known? Maybe the answer could be banning 
such products that are not at all necessary, especially cheap, bad 
quality/or single use items? Or replacing them with environmental-
friendly materials? Plastic items are useful in so many ways, hav-
ing thus an important role in the modern society. Consuming plastics 
should not be demonized, but the unnecessary and careless way of 
producing and consuming plastics, and creating piles of plastic waste 
should. Managing marine plastic litter needs a common approach, 
and commitment from all sectors. Otherwise this long-lasting material 
will continue to flow in the environment, creating severe environmen-
tal and societal problems that are difficult to solve afterwards.   
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Ecotechnology as an approach for 
sustainability studies
Despite of considerable financial and intellectual invest-ments contemporary global crisis still represents itself a serious threat for survival of humankind. Working hard to solve approaching global catastrophe related problems both experts and decision-makers are gradually recog-
nizing that crisis manifestations have been deeply rooted in human 
minds – accordingly, appropriate educational enhancements should 
be considered as an inevitable prerequisite to ensure our survival and 
health.
 Conventional mechanistic approach which long dominated envi-
ronmental / sustainable development education recently faces prag-
matically promising paradigm shift with e.g. ecotechnological thinking 
entering the field. Traditionally ecotechnological designs mean “part-
nership with nature” based ecosystem management practices which 
emphasize cost-effective, subtle low-input interference in intimate 
ecological processes (e.g. through triggering ecosystem self-design-
ing capacities) in order to ensure benefits both for nature and human 
society (applied in various environment related fields like wastewa-
ter treatment, nature protection, agricultural pest management, etc.). 
Such an approach contrasts with expensive, time-consuming and 
ecologically degradative environmental engineering activities and, 
thus, appeared to be attractive for environmental experts, govern-
ment officials, NGO activists, green entrepreneurs.
 More broadly, ecotechnological approach represents itself spe-
cific way of thinking which could be applied also beyond ecosystem 
management practice (e.g. in therapy, landscape architecture, in-
door design, advertisement business) and has been rooted in such 
complementary methodological principles like interdisciplinarity, mul-
tifunctionality, frugal creativity, reverse thinking, postmodern relativ-
ism, biomimicry, etc. Set of such principles could be perceived as 
“just-for-impression” list however in a real life reasoning practice prin-
ciples – figuratively speaking! – fuse together in a new intuitive gestalt 
enhanced, inter alia, by ethnobotanic, plant psychology, “traditional 
biodiversity knowledge”, etc. recognitions since ecotechnology could 
be traced back to relevant non-Western and ancient Western cultural 
experience. It should be emphasized that apart from professional 
education conventional target groups also general public could be 
involved since ecotechnological experience can offer creative ways 
to cover a wide spectrum of everyday problems.
 Recognizing methodological advantages of ecotechnological ap-
proach and, at the same time, lack of appropriate ecotechnological 
education in Latvia different sustainable development issues related 
stakeholders (like Kurzeme Business Incubator, Green-tech Cluster, 
Liepaja City Council, Eco Baltia Ltd., etc.) supported an idea to de-
velop Ecotechnological study program at Liepaja University.
 Accordingly, Professional Master study program “Ecotechnolo-
gies” (henceforth – SP) has been designed by Environmental Re-
search Center of Liepaja University in 2014. SP has been recognized 
by experts as being sustainably competitive and unique for Latvia; 
it is interdisciplinary, creative thinking and innovation oriented, tar-
geted to educate specialists capable to adapt themselves to chang-
ing labour market requirements (with potentials to ensure their self-
employment), and meeting thus sustainability criteria. However, one 
can ask a question, how successfully these declared claims have 
been implemented? As it has been revealed by sociological survey 
performed within SP`s audience (in 2015) students agree with com-
petitiveness of ecotechnological studies, recognize SP`s suitability 
for labour market, emphasize undoubtedly a new beneficial way of 
thinking being developed through implementation of study courses. 
Students surveyed stress interdisciplinary perspective, high compe-
tence of teachers, all the study courses relevance to program`s goals 
as SP`s strength.
 Acquired flexible ecotechnological thinking and relevant com-
petencies have been clearly demonstrated by thematic spectrum of 
Master thesis developed by SP` students – some examples: green 
walls for indoor health improvement, ecologically sound heat insu-
lation of culture heritage buildings, eco-bijouterie entrepreneurship, 
hemp-fiber based electric guitar construction, etc. Importantly, be-
sides creative ecotechnological design Master research involves also 
managemental dimension (with economic, legislative, communica-
tive, etc. tools utilized) to implement this design in a real-life situation.
 Summa summarum, SP`s implementation experience demon-
strates that ecotechnological approach integration within professional 
education represents itself an useful, competitive sustainable advan-
tage for any study program.   
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 5 2
R o b e r t s  J ū r m a l i e t i s 
Assistant professor, Ph.D
Environmental Research Center
Liepāja University
Latvia
L i l i t a  Ā b e l e
Lecturer, PhD candidate
Environmental Research Center
Liepāja University
Latvia
4 8
B a l t i c  R i m  E c o n o m i e s3 1 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 I S S U E  #  4
www.utu . f i /pe i
Networks for networks, or the 
changing Baltic Sea
M a r i e  C .  N o r d s t r ö m
Interaction networks describe how species in ecological communi-ties interact with each other, in the same way that social webs show human social interactions over the internet, and human dis-ease networks map disorders and diseases sharing associated genes. Marine food webs specifically describe feeding links be-
tween species in the sea, in short showing ‘who eats whom’. The 
structure of the food web is tightly linked to the ecological functioning 
in species communities, how the flow of energy and nutrients through 
the system is maintained. From a human perspective, a functioning 
food web may, for example, be able to sustain production of fish bio-
mass, i.e. food, in the face of a changing environment. 
 Humans are very much part of the Baltic Sea food web. Fishing 
for herring, sprat and cod, or plaice and flounder, positions us as sig-
nificant consumers in the network. On the other hand, our flushing of 
nutrients into the Baltic changes the base of the food web. Through 
our activities, we create favourable conditions for harmful algal 
blooms and deplete oxygen levels in deeper waters. Eutrophication 
has resulted in vast seafloor areas, about 49 000 km2 (roughly the 
size of Denmark!), that are characterized by conditions inhospitable 
for animal life. This means that large parts of the Baltic Sea have lim-
ited amounts, or are practically devoid of small invertebrate animals 
that function as a direct food source for fishes. In other words, hu-
man activities impact organisms big and small, and thereby influence 
the structure of the Baltic Sea food web in a top-down, as well as a 
bottom-up, manner.
 The architecture of feeding linkages further influences how eco-
systems respond to external stressors and whether they recover fol-
lowing perturbations. Ecosystems subject to enough pressure may 
undergo substantial change, and be kept from recovery by internal 
feedback mechanisms that can include feeding interactions. The 
Baltic Sea is believed to have undergone such a change in the late 
1980’s, when fishing pressure, following severe eutrophication, in-
duced a shift in the ecosystem. The altered conditions resulted in a 
Baltic Sea dominated by herring and sprat, instead of one dominated 
by cod, as before. Food web interactions contribute to upholding this 
change, for example, herring and sprat eat cod eggs and cod larvae, 
and also compete with young cod for zooplankton. So, what is going 
to happen to the food web in the future? The fact is that the Baltic 
Sea is continuing to change. The Baltic is among the fastest warm-
ing regions on the globe, and apart from leading to warmer waters, 
climate change will also alter water balance, circulation and salinity in 
the area. These changes are expected to impact biological processes 
in the Baltic Sea by influencing species distributions and interactions.
 How, then, do we move forward? Considering the complex-
ity of marine interaction networks and the social systems that they 
are connected to, it is fitting that successful ecological research of-
ten is achieved through networks. I am part of an Innovative Training 
Network called MARmaED, which stands for “Marine management 
and ecosystem dynamics under climate change” and is funded by 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme. In MARmaED, we 
are training young researchers in investigating how cumulative stress 
from biodiversity loss, climate change and harvesting will affect, not 
only the Baltic Sea, but in fact a number of Europe’s complex marine 
systems, as well as in assessing the consequences of these changes 
for optimal resource management. This ambitious task requires a 
broad approach, and our network comprises 8 universities and insti-
tutions from 6 different countries, and contains complementary exper-
tise both within and among science fields, from physics and biology to 
economics and ecosystem-based management. In addition, the early 
career researchers collaborate with representatives from the non-
academic sector, such as the International Council for Exploration of 
the Sea (ICES), members of industry, and other non-governmental 
organisations (WWF). The project is still in its first year, but I am very 
excited about the ongoing work and my team, studying in detail the 
food web and the functional diversity of the Baltic Sea in the face of 
environmental change. 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 
2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement 
No 675997. This publication reflects only the author’s view and the 
Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the 
information it contains.
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The enigma of Eurasianism
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 5 4
Vladimir Putin began his campaign for a third presidential term in October 2011 by publishing a remarkable article in a mass-circulation newspaper: “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future Starts Today.” In this propaganda piece, Putin argued for closer integration between Russia 
and several other post-Soviet countries – a process, he declared, that 
should ultimately lead to the formation of the “Eurasian Union.” From 
Moscow’s standpoint, the vision of the emerging Eurasian Union is 
strategically very important. According to the Kremlin’s geopolitical 
outlook, Russia can successfully compete globally with the United 
States, China or the European Union only if it acts as a leader of a re-
gional bloc. Bringing Russia and its ex-Soviet neighbors into a closely 
integrated community of states, Russian strategists believe, would 
allow this Eurasian association to become a major global center of 
power that could participate on par with other such centers in global 
and regional governance. Eurasian integration could thus become the 
principal political agenda of Putin’s third presidency. 
 Yet there appears to be much more to Putin’s “Eurasian vision” 
than considerations of geopolitical rivalry in the vast territory that was 
occupied until December 1991 by what Putin and other Russian poli-
cymakers like to call “historic” Russia. From their perspective, today’s 
Russian Federation is just a pale copy of its former grander self – the 
Soviet Union and its predecessor, the Russian Empire. Notably, Putin 
bemoaned the Soviet implosion, famously calling it the “greatest geo-
political catastrophe of the 20th century.”  
 And Putin is not alone in linking Russia’s destiny to the evoca-
tive concept of Eurasia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the notion of Eurasia came to be widely used in the West as well, in 
loose reference to the area which contains the post-imperial debris—
the successor states to the defunct communist superpower. It would 
seem, however, that for Putin, the understanding of Eurasia extends 
beyond the term’s geographical connotations. For him and for other 
leading members of Russia’s governing elite, the vision of Eurasian 
integration led by Russia has to do not so much with geography as 
with historical continuity and Russia’s identity as a great power. As 
such, this vision has a lot in common with a very special understand-
ing of Russia advanced in the group of doctrines collectively called 
evraziistvo or Eurasianism. And here is where the term Eurasia came 
from in the first place. 
 First formulated in the 1920s and 1930s by conservative-nation-
alist émigrés, Eurasianism reflected a deep rethinking of the meaning 
of Russia’s historical experience, and it offered a new future-oriented 
vision for a post-imperial Russia. Following in the tradition of Russian 
nationalist thinkers such as Nikolai Danilevskii or Fedor Dostoevs-
kii, the Eurasianists formulated an entirely new vision of Russia as 
“Russia-Eurasia”: a distinct and autonomous historical world stretch-
ing across the trans-continental spaces from Russia’s western bor-
derlands east to the Pacific, and south from the Arctic to Turkestan. 
From its earliest beginnings, they argued that Russia-Eurasia has 
been guided by the need to maintain the geopolitical unity of these 
Eurasian territories.  Moreover, a deep and unbridgeable gulf sepa-
rated Russia-Eurasia from the powerful but hostile civilizations that 
surrounded it, in particular Europe and the West in general. The Eura-
sianist movement flourished among Russian émigrés in the interwar 
period, but had largely died out by the onset of World War II. 
 In the 1980s, however, as Russians began to seek new, non-
Marxist perspectives on Russia’s place in the world, the teachings 
of the Eurasianists began to attract new attention.  By the moment 
of the Soviet Union’s collapse, support for it within the conservative 
Soviet establishment had grown quite considerably.  The concerns of 
the original Eurasianists with maintaining the geopolitical unity of the 
Russian state and stiffening its resistance to Western encroachment 
seemed to be as timely as ever. Eurasianism offered a compelling 
ideological narrative that appealed to those who opposed the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and believed that Russia needed a strong state. 
Throughout the 1990s, the ideas of Eurasianism proliferated exten-
sively, through books, newspapers, and political agitation.
 Today, Eurasianism has become one of the most pervasive key-
words in the lexicon of Soviet politics and public discourse.  The most 
significant practical outcome of this new interest is the creation, in 
January 2015, of the “Eurasian Economic Union,” a customs union 
joining the Russian Republic, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and 
Krygystan.  While the EEU represents a dramatic consummation of 
Putin’s bold 2012 appeal for Eurasian unity, it is far from clear what 
this new entity will actually amount to, not least because its various 
members do not necessarily share Russia’s great-power aspirations 
described above.  And more generally, the popularity and proliferation 
of Eurasianism has meant that it has ceased to represent a single 
coherent perspective.  It has great appeal beyond Moscow—e.g. Ta-
tarstan, Yakutia, Tuva and Kalmykia—but for reasons very different 
than in the Russian center.  Indeed, its has even spread beyond the 
former Soviet Union, and for example Turkey and Hungary have de-
veloped their own Eurasianist narratives.  In a sense, Eurasianism 
has become a truly global concept, which can be adapted by a wide 
variety of differing and even contesting political and projects.   
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Europe reloaded
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Europe is changing: 400 million Europeans are in competi-tion with 1.4 billion Chinese, 1.2 billion Indians not to speak about USA, the Russian Federation and Japan.     Till now the EU was in expansion and we think that ex-panding the economic space is a way to confine an existing 
crisis due to the high dynamics of the whole World and the mentioned 
competition.
 It seems that a point of saturation was reached and the geo-
graphical expansion has a draw back with the Brexit situation. This is 
changing the perspectives of the cooperation in Europe, obviously the 
U.K. will continue the economic cooperation with the other countries 
of Europe based on new principles but the participation in the com-
mon economic activities will be changed. Moreover, the political and 
commercial ties with other regions of the world will evolve indepen-
dently from the EU. It is hard to tell as yet what this will induce in terms 
of economic impacts.
 What are the ways and means to respond to this saturation that 
is likely to prolong the existing crisis situation? One historical solu-
tion is the introduction of military (should we call them governmental!) 
expenses. Replenishing arsenals and developing new technologies 
may relaunch the economies. In order to do that, though, one needs a 
threat that justifies the new type of economic efforts.  On this line the 
new raise of the Russian Federation in military actions may provide a 
justification for the EU to exit its economic crisis, although, prolonging 
the build up of military might is  increasing the probability to trigger its 
use that is definitely not advisable in any circumstances.
 What is happening with the energy field? The new technologies 
that are penetrating these last years are just the beginning. Storage 
(from large storage parks to car or house batteries), electric cars, 
smart grids, new conversion technologies such as photosynthesis, 
small modular reactors, individual convertors of energy, the internet of 
things, sea gas hydrates, Lithium, etc. are slowly now penetrating our 
day to day life. They are coming together with the need for cyber se-
curity, economic vulnerability of the present consumers (in the future: 
prosumers), impact on the productivity of the present day economic 
operators, as well as a new type of finance based on innovative finan-
cial schemes that will select surviving financial institutions to the new 
dynamics.
 Talking of dynamics one is lead to the concept of circular econom-
ics that must internalize the costs of environmental resources and 
impacts in the present days cost of capital. Else, as communism fell 
because it did not internalize the cost of capital, the capitalism may 
fall because it does not internalize the costs of environment. Circular 
economics is about this type of consideration of the use of resources 
and minimisation of impacts by changing the environmental liabilities 
into environmental assets through innovative technologies and sys-
tem structures and modes of operation. New indicators are discussed 
these days that will show more clearly the concept of evolution as 
based not only on GDP but on more complex combinations of primary 
socio economic indicators showing nonlinear behavior. As an exam-
ple pollution diseases increase the medical expenses in the GDP and 
large medical expenses in the GDP are regarded as progress. Is it 
really progress or just an indicator of how polluted that economy is?
 Energy combined with emissions of CO2 and with the number 
of persons in a given country as well as with the rate of waste recy-
cling and GDP, may lead to complex indicators that would change 
the present day GDP associated with the syntagma of ‘economic 
growth’. The succession of crises have shown that evolution is not 
only exponential but logistic (having a first increase phase followed by 
saturation). Energy systems penetration of technologies have shown 
to possess this type of behavior. May be the techniques used to de-
scribe their behavior are also useful to apply to financial systems as 
well as other socio-economic systems’ evolution. This would create a 
predictive capability that leads to stable evolution and to the advent 
of crises in a controlled manner similar to a flying system on a lighter 
plane designed with inherent instability and stabilised by computers 
– when ever a sudden change of direction is needed the instability is 
let loose. May be we need the crises to have the sudden change of 
economic mentality and behavior that lead to progress.
 The progress in the last hundred years was tremendous and, at 
the end, we hope that the present trend to colonize Mars and to im-
plement exquisitely new technologies to Earth will not be disrupted by 
the periodic military folly of humanity. Else, in 65 million years from 
now, a civilisation of ants will wonder how have disappeared the ‘di-
nosaurs’ living the Earth once.   
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Strategic storytelling in the public 
sector – not the same old story
H a n n a  S o f i a  R e h n b e r g
Once upon a time there was a boy who started from noth-ing in a damp cellar, and with loads of creativeness and persistence he gradually built up a whole, magical em-pire. We know versions of this story from a lot of compa-nies – Apple, Toyota, Ben & Jerry’s. In Sweden we have 
Ingvar Kamprad, the founder of Ikea, who stands out as the noble 
hero of a similar tale.
 When Swedish public organizations, like municipalities and state 
agencies, tell stories about themselves in strategic projects, the sto-
ries turn out slightly different. Usually it is not in the interest of public 
organizations to promote and glorify specific individuals, especially 
not founders (and what is more, efforts are commonly made to bring 
out not only men but also women in these stories).
 But to a large extent the strategic stories from the public sector 
serve similar purposes: they are used to market the organization in-
ternally and externally, to express specific values that the manage-
ment wants to establish as linked to the organization, to create a cor-
porate identity and image. In brief: they are branding tools, and they 
are used not least to influence the co-workers and to make them em-
brace the values promoted by the management. Strategic storytelling 
is part and parcel of a value-based leadership, a form of governance 
that is widely promoted these days.
 In this article I do three things. First of all, I argue that the story 
as a form of communication is perfectly compatible with today’s so-
cial order of things, which might explain its popularity in corporate 
communication. Secondly, I claim that strategic storytelling in public 
organizations to a certain degree needs to be different from strategic 
storytelling in companies. And thirdly, I point to the fact that stories as 
tools in organizational development come with both possibilities and 
limitations. 
 As a researcher I have observed a storytelling project targeted 
at and carried out among co-workers in the municipal organization of 
Malmö, Sweden’s third largest city. Similar projects have been con-
ducted at several other local and state authorities in all parts of Swe-
den. For instance, when the Swedish Transport Administration was 
established a few years ago, storytelling was used to create a com-
mon organizational culture founded on three core values (sensitivity, 
innovation, comprehensive view), which were established from the 
very start. 
 A common procedure in these projects is to collect stories among 
co-workers, who are encouraged to focus on moments when they 
have felt proud to work in the organization. In the next step repre-
sentatives of the management select a number of stories, which are 
then disseminated throughout the organization, where they are meant 
to form the basis for discussions about corporate core values.
 In Malmö a hundred stories were collected from meetings held 
with almost one thousand managers on all organizational levels. The 
project leader then selected fifteen stories that were spread in the 
organization, and all co-workers were instructed to select three par-
ticular values which they favoured in these stories. In the next step the 
project leader compiled and categorized the selected values, and out 
of this an official organizational core-value statement was formulated, 
once again in the form of three words (respect, devotion and creativ-
ity) and three accompanying sentences.
 The storytelling project in Malmö could be described as an at-
tempt to collectively create a core-value statement deeply-rooted in 
the organization. At the same time, a fair amount of governing was 
exercised, for instance through the selection of stories, which meant 
that some stories were promoted while others were discarded. In the 
case of the Swedish Transport Administration the situation was differ-
ent, since the corporate values were already set by the management 
before the storytelling project took place. Therefore the aim of the 
storytelling was to implement and anchor the predetermined values 
among the co-workers.
 So, what is it about stories that makes everyone embrace them? 
Why do not only companies but also municipalities and state agen-
cies want to tell stories nowadays? My answer to this question is that 
the story as a form of communication fits perfectly well in the prevail-
ing social order, where tributes are paid to the individual and to the 
informal. Stories have traditionally been used in informal contexts per-
meated with friendship and familiarity. Stories are about individuals, 
about persons, and they are told by persons to other persons. In other 
words, storytelling is a deeply human activity. 
 When the story as a form of communication is used in new con-
texts, it still conveys meanings of friendship, familiarity and individual-
ity. Organizations that tell stories become personified; they appear to 
be more human. Furthermore, the story as a form of communication 
was used strategically in the business world before it was discovered 
by managers in the public sector, and therefore it conveys an air of 
enterprise and modernity, which seems to be attractive to today’s pub-
lic organizations.
 But there are differences between the strategic storytelling of 
companies and that of public organizations. One difference could be 
traced to the fact that organizations in the public sector are in part 
more limited. They have to observe specific considerations (partly but 
not only because of secrecy rules and out of respect for personal 
integrity). As a result it could be more difficult for public organizations 
to produce spectacular and intriguing stories. Furthermore, as already 
touched upon, stories that make an impact are often about specific 
individuals, while the stories of public organizations tend to be popu-
lated by more anonymous representatives.
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 Finally, what happens when this new, strategic storytelling enters 
municipalities and state agencies? It depends, of course, on how it is 
used and handled. One implication of the fact that storytelling nowa-
days has an acknowledged place within the “grey authority sphere” 
is that the communicative palette is augmented by another colour. It 
might imply that more people get an opportunity to make their voices 
heard. On the other hand, when the plurality of stories are narrowed 
down and transformed into three core-value words, it could imply that 
some persons are rendered invisible – a worst case scenario is that 
the polyphony expressed in and through the variety of stories is trans-
formed into homophony.
 Eventually, it comes down to what kind of stories we are allowed 
to tell in our workplaces. Are all stories allowed? And is it allowed not 
to tell stories – is it permitted to choose another, less emotive form 
of communication when you communicate with employers and col-
leagues? 
E x p e r t  a r t i c l e  •  2 0 5 6
H a n n a  S o f i a  R e h n b e r g
Senior lecturer 
School of Culture and Education
Södertörn University
Sweden
To receive a free copy, 
register at www.utu.fi/pei
P a n - E u r o p e a n  I n s t i t u t e
 In short: strategic storytelling in the public sector implies possibili-
ties as well as limitations, and like all management tools it requires 
careful consideration.   
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Foreigners at the heart of Russian 
economic power 
K a r i  L i u h t o
There are more than four million companies in Russia but, despite the high number, the 25 largest corporations hold much of the nation’s economic power. An example of this concentration of power is that these corporations account for more than half of Russian oil and gas production, the 
country’s exports and investments abroad. The boards of these 25 
companies comprise almost 270 people, approximately 60 of whom 
were born outside the former Soviet Union (see the table at the end 
of the article). 
 There are over 25 British or US citizens serving as board mem-
bers. The third largest foreign group are Germans, who hold nearly 
10 seats. Matthias Warnig – a 
former employer of the Stasi, the 
secret police of the GDR – holds 
half of the German seats. Accord-
ing to interviews given by Warnig, 
he never met Vladimir Putin in 
the 1980s when the incumbent 
President of Russia was stationed 
as an intelligence officer in East 
Germany. Warnig has stated that 
his first contact with Putin took 
place in the early 1990s when 
Putin worked for the Committee 
for External Relations of the City 
of Saint Petersburg. 
 It is more common for foreign 
nationals to sit on the boards of 
private companies than on those 
of state-owned companies. State-owned companies only account 
for 20% of the board seats held by foreign nationals. Of these 12 
seats, Warnig holds three. The board seats grant this éminence grise 
power to influence national oil production, transportation and banking 
in Russia. Moreover, his position as the Managing Director of Nord 
Stream AG, the Russian state-controlled gas transmission company, 
provides him with a clear view of the EU gas supply. As Warnig works 
at the core of Russian foreign trade, he has, undoubtedly, taken on 
a significant, informal role in the co-operation between Germany and 
Russia. 
 Finnish citizens hold two seats in Russian boards. Esko Aho is a 
board member of Sberbank of Russia and Sakari Tamminen, former 
President and CEO of Rautaruukki, sits on the board of Severstal, a 
major Russian steel producer. The Russian corporations only have 
one assumingly Chinese board member. However, the number of Chi-
nese persons will already increase in the 2010s if the economic sanc-
tions push Russia closer to China and, instead of lending money to 
Russian corporations, China begins to increase its ownership in them. 
 Board members of Russian corporations also include a former 
European Commissioner for Trade, a former President of Armenia, 
a former Prime Minister of Finland, ex-Finance Minister of the UK, 
a former Minister of the Economy of Luxembourg, the Deputy Chief 
of Staff of a former US President, ex-Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research of the USA, and former Principal Private 
Secretary of The Prince of Wales. Western companies own signifi-
cant shares in Russian compa-
nies – even state-owned compa-
nies – and it is natural for them to 
send their own representatives to 
the Russian boards of directors to 
act in their best interest. But what 
is the justification for the board 
memberships of Western politi-
cians in situations where there is 
no underlying foreign ownership? 
 Even though personal rela-
tionships play a significant role 
in Russia, friendships do not 
comprise sufficient grounds for 
appointing corporate board mem-
bers – even in private companies. 
By including Western politicians 
on their boards of directors, Rus-
sian corporations are not seeking to attract strategic leadership skills 
or the latest expertise in international business. It is more likely that 
this is a way for Russian private companies to improve their inter-
national relations and even protection against unexpected develop-
ments in Russia or abroad. Accordingly, for Russian state-owned 
companies, the Western politicians are an informal communication 
channel and a means for furthering the company’s or even the Rus-
sian government’s agenda abroad. A Western politician may also be-
come a possible source of information for Russian intelligence.  
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